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This dissertation investigates differences between the U.S. and Europe in the
levels of taxation, redistribution, provision of public goods, and perception of fair-
ness in income inequality. The first chapter concentrates on the differences between
the U.S. and Scandinavia in higher education, and asks how it is possible that the
U.S. has considerably more unequal higher educational attainment, higher reliance
on private education and lower taxes than Nordic Europe, given similar political
institutions. To address this question, I develop a parsimonious overlapping genera-
tions model in which agents can choose between public and private education. I first
show that for a given tax rate difference of 7 percent, the model can deliver the ob-
served educational Transatlantic differences, without having to rely on cross-country
differences in preferences, parameters or other unorthodox elements. Next, I show
the model can provide insight into how either the U.S. or the Nordic tax regimes
could receive political consent. My explanation is due to the fact that per-capita
output and other macroeconomic variables are U-shaped in taxes, both in the model
and in the cross-country data. The economic intuition behind this finding is that
while at low tax rates an increase in taxes and public education provision dampen
human capital accumulation due to marked drops in private education attainment,
at high tax rates public education provision gets sufficiently large that a majority of
the population prefers public over private education, and further increases in taxes
boost public education attainment more than they reduce private one.
The second chapter incorporates the Transatlantic differences in perceptions
into the picture and asks how the fact that a majority of Europeans believe income
differences are primarily due to luck while a majority of Americans attribute such
differences to the role of effort and skill reconciles with Transatlantic macroeconomic
differences. I extend the model from the first chapter to include two sources of in-
dividual income differences: an inborn competence shock which affects labor supply
choice and education decisions, and a luck shock on income, which is orthogonal to
decision rules and inborn abilities. I find that low taxes coupled with low public
education provision, as in the U.S. case, induce a large impact of inborn competence
on schooling and labor supply, which in turn implies that a large share of the U.S.
income differences are due to skill, education and effort. By contrast, a combina-
tion of high taxes and high public education, as in Europe, minimizes total income
inequality and differences due to effort and inborn competence, and magnifies the
impact of luck on inequality, in accordance with the existing beliefs. I also show that
the U-shaped behavior of macro variables and welfare gains in taxes, as documented
in the first chapter, carries over to this model, thereby providing insight into the
political sustainability of macroeconomic variables and perceptions.
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Chapter 1
Higher Education in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: Revisiting
the Transatlantic Differences
1.1 Introduction
Education plays a seminal role in a modern economy by serving as a fundamental
determinant of economic growth and income inequality through the human capital
channel.1 While the importance of education is well-acknowledged, ideal and sus-
tainable system-design for education, especially at the tertiary level and above has
been a controversial subject among researchers.2 ,3
Lack of consensus on ideal higher education design is present among policy-
makers, as well. Sources of financing and public versus private education choices are
two of the most central and controversial issues, and countries show considerable
degree of disparities in these dimensions. Figure 1.1 displays one of the major ac-
counts on expenditure, average tuition fees for tertiary public education across most
1For a detailed literature review on the role of human capital in macroeconomics, see Romer
(1986), Lucas (1988), Benabou (1996), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), among others.
2While there is a reasonable degree of consensus in the literature on some fundamentals, such as
that public education alleviates income inequality in the long-run (Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003;
Benabou, 2005) for example, differing results have been documented on other issues such as on the
role of provision of public vs private education on output growth.) For instance, whereas Glomm
and Ravikumar (2003) claim private education fuels output growth more than public education,
many claim otherwise (Benabou, 2000, 2002, 2005; Zhang, 2005).
3Among others, Mankiw (1997) argues later stages of education contribute more to human
capital accumulation (as it can be inferred from opportunity cost of schooling or college premium),
and are more influential in determining the level of knowledge-based externalities. This chapter
takes a similar stance, and concentrates on higher education, which displays more variation across
countries compared to primary and secondary education.
1
of the OECD countries. Noticeably, the average tuition fee of the U.S. lies above
the remaining developed countries, and the discrepancy is much more evident when
the comparison is between the U.S. and the Northern European “welfare states”
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), which have average tuition fees
close to zero.
Figure 1.1: Average Public Tertiary Tuition Fee by Country
Figure 1.1 accounts only for the public institutions. In Table 1.1, I illustrate
both public and private higher education expenditures, as well as some other edu-
cational indicators of the emphasized countries.
As shown in the first two columns, average tuition fee in the U.S. is not only
2





























Denmark $0 N/A -$217 -0.59% 98% 57% 34%
Finland $0 $0 -$300 -0.87% 87% 71% 37%
Iceland $0 $4,253 $851 2.26% 80% 73% 31%
Norway $0 $5,427 $150 0.27% 88% 70% 36%
Sweden $0 $0 -$239 -0.63% 93% 73% 32%
Nordic
Average
$0 $2,420 $49 0.09% 89% 69% 34%
USA $5,493 $21,979 $10,412 22.42% 67% 65% 41%
1. Fees are in equivalent USD converted using PPPs.
2. Among 25-64 year-old population.
Source: Education at a Glance 2010, OECD, and World Development Indicators database, 2010.
higher for public institutions but also for private institutions. Actually, it is possible
to see that average private tuition for the Nordic countries is only one-tenth of that
of the U.S. The fourth column in Table 1.1 shows that while no less than 89% of
tertiary type-A students are enrolled in public institutions in Scandinavian countries,
approximately two-thirds of students in the U.S. attend public type-A programmes.4
Using these weights, as well as other data on scholarship opportunities, I derive
average tuition fees net of subsidies and report the resultant numbers in the third
and the fourth columns.5 Macro data suggests that while average Scandinavian
tuition fees are negligible relative to the per-capita income level, these fees amount
to 22% of the U.S. per-capita income.6 Also, as demonstrated in the 6th and 7th
columns, net entry rates to higher education institutions and ratios of the population
4According to the OECD definition, tertiary-type A programmes (ISCED 5A) are largely
theory-based and are designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research
programmes and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or architec-
ture, and typically last four or more years.
5Due to lack of some data including scholarship data for Norway, and average private tuition
for Denmark, I estimate the average tuition fee in the most conservative way possible so as not to
underestimate Nordic average tuition costs. Details of calculations are available upon request.
6One could suspect this discrepancy being as a result of implicit costs. Global Higher Education
Rankings 2010 report Usher and Medow (2010) suggests that higher private education costs of the
U.S. result holds even after controlling for all implicit costs, including cost of living, out-of-pocket
expenses, tax-rate differentials, fellowship opportunities, etc.
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holding higher education degrees are comparable among these countries.7
An alternative way to document the presence of structural disparities in higher
education systems across countries is to analyze aggregate higher education expendi-
tures and their composition. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, while the higher education
expenditures as a share of GDP in the Scandinavian countries are only slightly above
the OECD average, the U.S. has the noticeable largest higher education expenditure
as a share of GDP.
Figure 1.2: Higher Education Expenditure by Country
I report the results of a deeper comparison of the higher education expenditures
of the U.S. and the Nordic countries is in Table 1.2. The first column shows that the
higher education expenditure per student in the U.S. is almost double that of the
Nordic average, yet decomposing these expenditures reveals that public component
7Although population with higher education in the U.S. is slightly above that of the Nordic
average, this result is mainly due to the inclusion of the older population: whereas the fraction of
the older population (55-64) who hold a higher education degree in the U.S. is very close to that of
the younger population (25-34), this is not the case for Scandinavia where the difference is higher
in favor of the younger population. Accordingly, one could expect even closer participation rates
in the medium-run.
4
of the higher education expenditure in the U.S. is still lower than that of Nordic
countries, except for Iceland. Further, whereas the ratio of public higher education
expenditure to total higher education expenditure is no less than 87.5% for the
Scandinavian countries, this ratio is only about one-third for the U.S.



















Denmark $16,466 1.6% 0.1% 96.50% $15,497 $969
Finland $13,566 1.6% 0.1% 96.07% $12,768 $798
Iceland $6,721 1.1% 0.1% 91.01% $6,161 $560
Norway $17,754 1.2% 0.0%2 95.83% $17,140 $6142
Sweden $18,361 1.4% 0.2% 89.73% $16,066 $2,295
Nordic
Average
$14,451 1.4% 0.1% 93.90% $13,526 $1,047
USA $27,010 1.0% 2.1% 32.27% $8,713 $18,297
1. Fees are in equivalent USD converted using PPPs.
2. Approximate value for Norway is calculated using OECD data and Docampo (2007).
Source: Education at a Glance 2010, OECD.
Finally, although there are no direct comparable measures of higher educa-
tional attainment by country, the literature on education uses international stan-
dardized tests conducted on population samples to infer educational dispersion. For
instance, Blau and Kahn (2005) use OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey
to show that there is a higher degree of variation in the test scores of the U.S. com-
pared to those of the Scandinavian countries, as shown in Table 1.3. It is easy to
notice that while the mean scores are not significantly different between the U.S.
and the Nordic average, more disperse scores in both the right and the left end of
the distributions are evident.
Additional anecdotal evidence supporting the presence of greater educational
dispersion in the U.S. comes from Barry McGaw, (Director of Education for the
OECD) who states in a speech that “...the very best schools in the U.S. are ex-
5
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics from the International Adult Literacy Survey
Mean Std. Dev. Differential
50-10 Percentile 90-50 Percentile
Denmark 294.65 36.51 53.75 37.71
Finland 296.60 39.69 54.32 44.32
Norway 303.06 38.07 54.65 40.18
Sweden 310.07 44.73 54.53 51.48
Nordic Average 301.09 39.75 54.26 43.42
United States 289.27 60.61 76.84 59.16
Based on Blau and Kahn (2005).
traordinary ... but the big concern in the U.S. is the diversity of the quality of
institutions...”(Fuller, 2005).
Another drastic Transatlantic difference is on taxation. The continental Euro-
pean countries, especially the Northern ones, are known to have considerably higher
average income tax levels and more progressive tax systems than that of the United
States. Although tax structures are highly sophisticated which makes cross-country
comparison challenging, a simpler measure such as the taxes on income and profits
as a percentage of GDP can be employed to show that Scandinavian governments
levy significantly higher income taxes than the U.S. on average, as illustrated in
Table 1.4. In addition, total tax revenues of the countries of interest also differ
Table 1.4: Tax Revenue from Incomes and Profits as a Share of GDP
2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Denmark1 31.16% 29.90% 29.36% 29.17% 29.90%
Finland 16.82% 16.69% 16.89% 16.82% 16.81%
Iceland 17.55% 18.28% 18.45% 17.83% 18.03%
Norway 21.43% 22.04% 21.09% 21.63% 21.55%
Sweden 19.12% 19.06% 18.35% 16.79% 18.33%
Nordic Average 21.22% 21.20% 20.83% 20.45% 20.92%
USA 12.65% 13.45% 13.61% 11.77% 12.87%
1. The total tax revenues have been reduced by the amount of any capital transfer that represents uncollected taxes.
The capital transfer has been allocated.
Source: OECD Tax Database, 2010.
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drastically, as shown in Table 1.5. While these governments use tax revenues for
many purposes, at least some fraction of the tax pool is utilized in the financing of
the provision of public education.8
Table 1.5: Total Tax Revenue as Share of GDP
2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Denmark1 50.83% 49.62% 48.98% 48.18% 49.40%
Finland 43.94% 43.84% 43.00% 43.13% 43.48%
Iceland 40.65% 41.49% 40.64% 36.79% 39.89%
Norway 43.52% 43.97% 43.82% 42.60% 43.48%
Sweden 48.87% 48.32% 47.36% 46.30% 47.71%
Nordic Average 45.65% 45.45% 44.76% 43.40% 44.79%
USA 27.10% 27.85% 27.86% 26.06% 27.22%
1. The total tax revenues have been reduced by the amount of any capital transfer that represents uncollected taxes.
The capital transfer has been allocated.
Source: OECD Tax Database, 2010.
A final remark is that both the U.S. and the Nordic countries are well-established
democracies with high performances in electoral processes and pluralism.9 There-
fore, it would be reasonable to expect that the different higher educational systems
and tax policies receive considerable consent from the respective electorates.
The sources of and mechanisms for the coexistence of these two systems are
not clear a priori. In particular, given that both the U.S. and Scandinavian coun-
tries are well-established democracies with comparable income levels, presence of the
radical discrepancies in the composition of public versus private higher education
choices deserves attention. This chapter intends to address the aforementioned dif-
ferences with a two-fold agenda. First, using a general equilibrium model, I illustrate
that tax differentials alone can explain the observed disparities, without having to
8For a detailed discussion on the taxation and redistribution of the countries of interest, see
Alesina and Glaeser (2005).
9Among others, see The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2007 and Freedom
in the World: 2009 Edition.
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rely on differences in preferences, variations in deep structural parameters or other
unorthodox elements. While doing so, I use a heterogeneous-agent overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) model with both public and private education options available in
the choice set of agents in the presence of positive externalities and distortionary
taxes for public education financing. By calibrating the model to target countries’
GDP (PPP) per capita and public-to-total-higher-education-expenditure ratios, I
show that a reasonable tax rate difference of 7% can endogenously deliver a higher
ratio of total higher education expenditure to GDP, higher hours worked, lower
public school attendance ratios, and more unequal distributions of macro variables
for the U.S. when compared to the Nordic countries. Next, by investigating welfare
implications of different tax regimes, I show that either of the calibrated economies
can gain political support from large measures of the population. This result is
due to the U-shaped behavior of macro variables over the tax rate in the model, a
phenomenon that I show is also present in the data. The intuition behind this result
is that at low rates, an increase in taxes and public education spending dampens
human capital accumulation due to decreases in private education attainment, while
at high rates, public education provision gets sufficiently large so that the majority
of the population prefers public education over private, and an increase in the tax
rate boosts public education attainment more than it dampens private education.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, I discuss the
related literature; in Section 1.3; I describe the model environment, in Section 1.4 I
report and discuss results; and Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 Related Literature
Previous studies in the macro branch of education literature and earlier research on
Transatlantic differences have not reached a consensus on the sources of the afore-
mentioned discrepancies, or their resultant macroeconomic implications. Very few
studies attempt to explain the disparities in education using methods employed by
the neoclassical economic theory. Benabou (2000) being the exception, investigates
the role of progressivity in taxes and redistribution on educational outcomes in a
heterogeneous-agent economy, and shows that two distinct equilibria can emerge
depending on whether the efficiency-enhancing effect or the redistributive effect of
education dominates. He emphasizes the role of imperfections in democracies to ex-
plain how different economies could stay inertial at different equilibria. However, he
works with a stylized model, makes several restrictive assumptions on the parameter
space to derive closed-form solutions, and does not study the co-existence of public
and private education at the same system.
Soares (2006) also studies the relationship between education and macro vari-
ables in a general equilibrium model under democracy, but he does not focus on
the aforementioned discrepancies between the countries of interest. Further, he in-
troduces heterogeneity only in age cohorts by employing an overlapping generation
model and studies the pivotal role of different age cohorts on educational and macro
outcomes.10 Finally, Zhang (2005) extends the model by Benabou (2000) and stud-
10The orthodox point of view in the literature is that the fundamental source of heterogeneity
with regards to education should be in innate productivity (which in turn affects human capital,
labor, income, wealth and education levels) (e.g. Benabou, 2000, 2002, 2005; Zhang, 2005), and
accordingly it is crucial not to ignore heterogeneity in inborn abilities while studying the role of
education, as studied in this chapter.
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ies the role of education in the presence of both physical and human capital, and
reaches similar qualitative conclusions as Benabou (2000). However, he does not ad-
dress the Transatlantic differences or the implications of the co-existence of private
and public education, either.
A related branch of literature examines why European countries have more
pronounced redistributive policies than the United States. Lindbeck (1995) argues
that habits and social norms influence economic incentives, which in turn shape
habits and social norms. He claims that different multiple equilibria can emerge as
a result of this feedback mechanism. Saint-Paul (2001) focuses on economic founda-
tions of multiple equilibria and shows that, contrary to the general prediction that
higher inequality induces more redistributive policies, if a large fraction of the popu-
lation is concentrated in the lower-tail of the income distribution, redistribution may
decrease and inequality may increase at the same time. Similar to the qualitative
conclusions as in Saint-Paul (2001), Hassler et al. (2003) show that expectations
of higher redistribution in the future can lead to lower investments today, which in
turn increases future demand for redistribution, and this feedback mechanism allows
for the emergence of multiple equilibria.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) group potential sources of Transatlantic differences
into economic, political and behavioral fundamentals. The first group, economic
explanations, rely on the differences in variance and skewness of pre-tax income,
social costs of taxation, and income mobility prospects of the median-voter. They
claim that empirical evidence does not support economic explanations strongly, since
pre-tax and transfer income in the United States has both higher variance and a
10
more skewed distribution than in Europe; deadweight losses from taxation are not
noticeably lower in Europe; and European Union integration has not changed the
degree of redistribution, hence the demand for insurance, significantly.11
The second category, political explanations, focus on the presence of institu-
tions that prevent minorities of any sort from gaining political power and the enforce-
able laws protecting individuals’ private property. Examples of such institutions can
be U.S.’s lack of representative democracy, which could promote bargaining powers
of for small groups with common interests, (e.g. the absence of a socialist party,
which is represented strongly in many of the European countries), and the U.S.
Supreme Courts’ pro-private-property attitude (as in the rejection of federal income
tax in 1894). Authors argue that political explanations have at least some degree
of legitimacy in explaining the observed aforementioned differences. For instance,
Alesina et al. (2005) claim that empirically racial discord hinders redistribution
significantly. For the U.S. case, they claim that due to racial animosity, many white
voters find it unappealing to vote for pronounced redistribution to the poor, who
are proportionately black. Authors claim that electorates in the U.S. want to have
control over their charitable donations, and direct them as they please.
Behavioral explanations focus on the perception of fairness of the market and
the role of luck versus effort in the determination of economic outcomes. Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) argue that if the common perception in an economy is that
11Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that prospects of moving up in the income distribution may
be mildly higher for the U.S. middle-class households, which could incentivize them to vote for
lower and less progressive redistributive policies, yet even in the presence of this controversial
fact, authors believe the proposed economic explanations are not the likely roots of the divergent
multiple equilibria.
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luck is strongly decisive in economic outcomes, agents will unlikely be motivated to
exert high effort. In equilibrium, due to limited effort exerted, luck indeed turns out
to be influential, and initial beliefs that luck is decisive on final outcomes is verified.
Meanwhile, in order to insure themselves against unlucky future scenarios, agents
favor redistributive policies over laissez-faire ones, and economy stays inertial at the
high tax and high-luck-decisiveness equilibrium. In contrast, if agents perceive the
market to be fair and the role of luck to be minimal, they will be motivated to exert
high effort, which in turn reduces the decisiveness of luck in equilibrium. Under
this scenario, laissez-faire policies are favored over pronounced redistributive poli-
cies due to the foreseeable future and lower need for insurance. Authors show that
54% of Americans believe effort determines final outcome whereas only 29% of the
population in Europe is in agreement with this belief. They document a significant
correlation between perceptions on high decisiveness of luck and social spending
per-capita across countries, and establish a model based on these preliminaries by
extending Piketty (1995) that can generate multiple equilibria. However, the model
they propose implies the suggested American equilibrium to Pareto-dominate the
European one, and authors do not explain why Europeans would not want to switch
to the better U.S. equilibrium. Also, they model household utility to decrease over
the inequality in the economy they live in, which can be considered controversial.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) also set up a model with beliefs that are verified in equi-
librium, yet they do so by using the “need” to believe in a just world and “cognitive
dissonance” as the necessary elements. However, the de facto degree of holding back
bad news from offsprings is hard to measure, which makes the testing of the model
12
almost impossible. Although these studies shed light to Transatlantic differences to
a great extent by formalizing behavioral explanations, they both rely on relatively
unorthodox elements to the neoclassical economic theory, and the proposed models
are not suitable for welfare comparisons or policy analyses.
So far, the determination and implications of an education system in which
both public and private education options co-exist in the choice set of heteroge-
neous agents have not been investigated. Further, welfare analyses of individuals
under different tax and education systems have often been neglected. This chapter
intends to fill this gap in the literature by combining the features of a standard
heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model with the elements proposed in the
education literature.12
1.3 Model
The model I propose in this section is a heterogeneous-agent overlapping generations
(OLG) model with two cohorts: young and middle-aged, both with the same mea-
sure (normalized to unity), and without population growth. The young are born
with an inborn exogenous cognitive competence, e.g. IQ shock. This stochastic
12The presence of co-existent education types is particularly interesting, because as I show in
the following sections, it generates results that are considerably different than the scenario in
which there is the provision of only a single education type, as in Benabou (2000). This result
can be attributed to the fact that absence of co-existent education type fails to account for the
crucial disincentivizing role of public education, which causes overestimation of the benefits of
public education and generates misleading predictions on the behaviors of macroeconomic variables,
specifically on average per-capita output, and inequality. Further, it is important to acknowledge
that the form of public education in the Scandinavian countries are mostly predominant attendance
to public schools, as opposed to subsidies for private education, which also supports the view that
a more realistic representation of reality also requires the distinction between the two types of
education systems while modeling. This chapter, at least partially, sheds some light on these
grounds, as well.
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capacity, together with educational bequests from parents (if any) or the present
provision of public education, economy-wide human capital and parental non-labor
time and human capital determine their human capital, which they use as a factor of
production next period when middle-aged.13 The middle-aged decide how much to
work, consume, and bequeath for the offspring’s education due to altruism motive.
There is a single distortionary income tax, which is the only instrument to
finance public education. For simplicity, the model assumes the tax rate to be con-
stant and exogenous to the economy, although its welfare implications are addressed
and discussed in detail in the following sections.14 Tax rate, together with the levels
and distributions of human capital and labor supply determine the level of public
education provision in the economy.
The primary focus of the chapter is to study long-run properties, therefore
the model assumes there are no aggregate shocks, which in turn implies that the
economy to stay inertial at its stationary equilibrium at all times and all aggregate
variables and the consequent distributional properties are constant at their long-run
values.
13The young do not optimize, and only abide by the law of motion for human capital. Further,
the model assumes the young do not consume, or in other words their consumption is normalized
to zero. This assumption is not critical for the results, yet facilitates the solution of the model.
14As it is discussed in detail in the following sections, the proposed model does not feature
single-peaked preferences, and single-crossing property does not hold globally. In the absence
of single-crossing property, dynamic politico-economic solution of the model, as in Corbae et al.
(2009), is not as straightforward as keeping track of the median-voter’s preferences, and accordingly
is left to future research.
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1.3.1 Model Environment
Middle-aged agent i ∈ [0, 1] begins the period with a human capital level h ∈ H
and observes his child’s inborn competence ξ ∈ Ξ. Next, for the given tax and pub-
lic education levels, middle-aged agent decides whether to choose the state-funded
public education or private education along with its level for his child, together with
how much labor to supply and consume. Public education is provided in a rival
and non-excludable way, yet offered in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion at some degree:
Those who choose private education, regardless of the level of their choice, cannot
fully enjoy public education benefits and incur an opportunity cost of forgoing some
fraction of the benefits of the present public education.15 Private education is not
free, however it provides the middle-aged agents with the opportunity of picking any
level of education they want at its respective cost.
Formally, the middle-aged agent i at time t solves:
V (h, ξ;H,E, τ) = max
{c,l,e}
{
u(c) + v(1− l) + ρ
∑
ξ′




c = (1− τ)Θl(1−λ)hλ − e (1.2)
e ≥ 0 (1.3)
15In reality, only about 40% of the students attend higher education for both the U.S. and the
Scandinavian countries, which implies there is excludability present, although at similar degrees for
the countries of interest. This assumption is aimed to keep model simple and tractable enough, and
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for given parameters, tax rate τ , aggregate human capital H , and public education
level E, where c denotes consumption, l denotes labor supplied, h denotes individual
human capital at period t (h′ denotes individual human capital at period t+1, as the
other variables with prime notation), e denotes private education bequest, ρ denotes
altruistic discount rate, Θ denotes the constant productivity technology, ξ denotes
the inborn cognitive competence of the offspring, and π(·) denotes the Markov-chain
transition probability matrix of the stochastic inborn competence process. Equation
1.2 is the standard budget constraint of the household. Output technology requires
the use of labor and human capital as factors of production, and tax is paid to
the government proportional to the income. Education and consumption decisions
are made out of disposable income. As shown in Equation 1.3, private education
bequests cannot take negative values.16
Human capital evolves according to Equation 1.4 so that there are economy-
wide complementarities and limited transmission of skills across generations.17,18
16As it can be inferred from Equation 1.3, the relative price of education with respect to the
consumption good is normalized to unity. This simplification is not central to the results, and does
not change qualitative conclusions for a reasonable range of relative prices.
17In the literature, some authors (e.g. Benabou, 2005) introduce complementarities in the econ-
omy by incorporating aggregate human capital as a factor of production in the output production
technology. I argue that incorporating complementarities in the law of motion of individual hu-
man capital, as in Zhang (2005), is a more reasonable approach, which can be interpreted as the
knowledge-base of the economy facilitating the accumulation of human capital. Modeling comple-
mentarities as Benabou (2005) does not change results, qualitatively.
18Skill transmission of human capital across generations is a common approach employed in the
16
Finally, inborn competence is log-normally distributed as shown in Equation 1.5,
and while households know its distribution, they cannot foresee or insure themselves
against IQ shocks hitting future generations.
ν in Equation 1.4 denotes the fraction of public education benefit to the private
school students, or the “public education spillover”.19 In other words, if ν takes a
non-zero value, students who attend private education can still enjoy a fraction of
the provided public education level.
Let ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) be the optimal education decision rule, and h̃(h, ξ;H,E, τ)
be the individual human capital rule for the next period implied by the optimal
education rule. Then, the stationary distribution of the economy satisfies:






′, ξ)dµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) (1.6)
where χ(·) denotes the indicator function. The middle-aged household is rational
in making his choices, so the aggregate human capital level household takes as
given in the optimization problem must indeed be the economy’s resultant aggregate
human capital enforced by the stochastic processes, agents’ decision rules and their
education literature. In fact, Schuetz et al. (2008) empirically verify the presence of intergenera-
tional skill transmission across countries at different rates. For a detailed discussion on the family
background effects on educational performance and list of a number of studies concentrating on
the human capital transmission, see Hanushek and Woessmann (2010).
19Reasonably, one could model the spillover parameter ν in several ways, potentially as an
increasing function of public school attendance ratio. However, there is no previous study or data
that sheds light on the public education spillover effects, and taking it as a parameter, possibly
as a result of the established institutions, can be regarded as the more conservative way of not
to overstating the complementarity benefits of relying heavily on public education. More on this
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Finally, the government runs a balanced budget, so that the expenditure on the




τ(Θl(1−λ)hλ)dµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) (1.8)
1.3.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium under constant exogenous taxes is a set of
value functions, decision rules, allocations and stationary distribution, such that
1. Given H , E, and τ , c̃(h, ξ;H,E, τ), l̃(h, ξ;H,E, τ) and ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) are
optimal decision rules to household agent i’s problem, h̃(h, ξ;H,E, τ) is the
implied human capital rule by the optimal education decision, V (h, ξ;H,E, τ)
is the resultant value function, and inborn cognitive capability follows its ex-
ogenous law of motion:
V (h, ξ;H,E, τ) = max
{c,l,e}
{
u(c) + v(1− l) + ρ
∑
ξ′




c = (1− τ)Θl(1−λ)hλ − e (1.10)
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2. The time-invariant stationary distribution satisfies:






′, ξ)dµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) (1.14)
3. All aggregate variables stay constant at all periods:
Ht = Ht+1 = . . . = H (1.15)
Yt = Yt+1 = . . . = Y (1.16)
Ct = Ct+1 = . . . = C (1.17)
Lt = Lt+1 = . . . = L (1.18)
Et = Et+1 = . . . = E (1.19)
4. Aggregate resource constraint holds:
Y = C + E +
∫
H×Ξ
edµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) (1.20)
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ldµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ) (1.25)
1.3.3 Calibration
Solving the stationary equilibria of the model economy analytically is not feasible
due to the frequent corner solutions for most parts of the tax space, and a natu-
ral candidate for deriving optimal decisions is the use of value function iteration
technique. Further, due to the absence of aggregate shocks, Huggett (1993) algo-
rithm is convenient to solve the stationary competitive equilibrium by the use of
Monte-Carlo simulations, the details of which I discuss in the appendix.
The benchmark parameter values I employ in the model are displayed in Table
1.6. Following Benabou (2002), I set the value for the share of human capital in
output (λ) to 0.625, and mean and standard deviation of natural logarithm of the
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Table 1.6: Benchmark Parameter Values
λ 0.625 Benabou (2002)
γ 0.200 Zhang (2005)
ρ 0.800 Zhang (2005)
ε 0.300 Benabou (2002) & Zhang (2005)
µξ 0.000 Benabou (2002)
σξ 1.000 Benabou (2002)
l 0.330 RBC Literature
ν 0.500 Neutral Stance from Two Polar Cases





τUS 4.784% Calibrated to Match E/E = 32.27% for the U.S.
τNor 11.774% Calibrated to Match E/E = 93.90% for the Nordic Average
inborn cognitive competence shock (µξ and σξ) to 0 and 1, respectively. Following
Zhang (2005), I set the elasticity of human capital with respect to parental time-away
from work (γ) to 0.2, and the altruistic discount rate (ρ) to 0.8. In the literature,
the elasticity of human capital with respect to education (ǫ) varies between 0.15-
0.4. I assign a value close to the mean, 0.3. I also set the total factor productivity
technology (Θ) to 5 so as to match the share of public-to-total education expenditure
for the U.S. and Nordic targets at their relative per-capita output values.
Due to the absence of earlier studies or available data on public education
spillovers, I report results with three alternative parameter values, ν : 0, 0.5 and 1.
The model with ν = 0, coined as the no public education spillover model can be
considered an environment where there are only two major types of higher education
institutions, and students can benefit from only one of the two types of institutes,
and government does not subsidize private institutions at all. In other words, public
education is offered in a perfectly take-it-or-leave-it fashion. The model with ν = 1,
tagged as the full public education spillover model, can be thought as an environment
where there is only one type of an education type, which is public education, and
students who want to get higher education have to attend public schools. In addition
21
to the public education, however, those who want to pursue further education can
choose to attain additional private education, e.g. by private tutoring, certificate
programs, etc. In other words, private education students have to incur nominal
cost of private education, but they do not have to forgo public education benefits
as in no spillover model.20 Finally, the model in which spillover is set to ν = 0.5,
coined as the model with limited public education spillover, is intended to study the
environment where students who participate in private education can still benefit
from the provided public education, yet not as much as the public school students.
In other words, they can still benefit from the public education level, yet only at
the spillover fraction.21 In reality, neither of the two polar cases are very likely, and
a combination of the two is not only more reasonable, but also seems to fit better
with the data, as shown in the results section.
Finally, for the U.S. and the Nordic average all parameter values are kept the
same, except for the tax rate, which is calibrated so that higher public-to-total-
education-ratios match the data. The primary purpose of this parametrization is
to show that without introducing any unorthodox elements, or relying on variations
in “deep” parameter values, the model can deliver many of the aforementioned
20Full spillover specification is intended to capture the dynamics of the Nordic economies better
since public education attendance is very extensive for most of these countries, and the no spillover
specification is not very suitable for such cases. To exemplify the degree of extensiveness of
public education institutes in Scandinavia, an examination on the composition of Nordic European
universities reveal that aside from very few exceptions, there are not any private universities in
Finland or Sweden. In Denmark, the only private universities are business schools, and in Norway
no less than 90% of the students attend public universities. Iceland, being a small outlier among
the Nordic countries is private-reliant, yet her overall public higher school attendance ratio is no
less than 80%. Also, note that an education system which provides only public education by the
means of private school vouchers would be isomorphic to the full spillover model.
21Due to the lack of earlier studies on public education spillover, ν is set to 0.5 so as to model
spillover as equally distant from the two polar cases.
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Transatlantic differences by only relating to tax rate differentials.
For utility, I employ the natural logarithmic function. For the ease of deliv-
ering the intuition behind the model, at first, I make the following fairly restrictive
assumption: although taxes are known to alter labor supply choice by economic the-
ory, I fix the amount of labor supplied by all middle-aged individuals to a constant.
I also normalize the utility from leisure v(1−l) to zero. In a later section, I relax this
assumption and endogenize labor in accordance with a balanced-growth-consistent
functional form, and show that key findings under the fixed-labor assumption are
not qualitatively different than the results with endogenous labor supply.
1.4 Results
In this section, I first display my findings on the behaviors of micro and macro
variables under different tax regimes of the model with limited public education
spillover. Next, I report comparative statics with alternative parameter values in
order to illustrate how different channels affect the variables of interest. Then, I
revisit real world evidence, and discuss how the model fits to the data not only for
the U.S. and the Scandinavian countries, but also for the remaining developed OECD
economies. Then, I drop the fixed labor assumption and compare how variables of
interest differ with endogenous labor. Finally, I analyze the behavior of welfare of
agents over taxes so as to provide insight into how calibrated economies can be gain
political consent.
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1.4.1 Benchmark Results with Limited Public Education Spillover
First, I derive the value functions and optimal decision rules of agents at different
individual human capital and inborn competence state pairs ({h, ξ} ∈ H×Ξ). The
value functions are verified to be smooth, concave and increasing in both dimen-
sions.22,23 The highest dynastic utility is attained under the laissez-faire economy
for the rich (i.e. agents with high h and ξ pairs), and high enough tax environments
(e.g. τ = 15%) for the poor, which is in accordance with the economic theory. In
between the two tax rates, life-time utility values are lower compared to the two po-
lar tax regimes, the reasons of which are discussed in detail in the following sections.
Also, as tax rate goes up, value functions are observed to be more concave and less
steep due to the moderating redistributive role of the taxes through the provision
of public education.
In Figure 1.3 and 1.4, I illustrate the decision rules at the two extreme tax sce-
narios. Except for minor irregularities due to computational restrictions, education
choices are observed to be concave and smooth for both tax regimes.
The flat surface in education choice under the high tax regime in Figure 1.4
reflects the public education choice of agents whereas the concave monotonically-
increasing part is due to the private education choice. The extensive margin decision,
which can be observed only high-enough tax regimes (since there is no provision of
22Given that inborn competence shocks are not persistent and mean-reverting, the life-time
utility values in different cognitive-competence states are only moderately different. Conversely,
individual human capital persists over generations as a result of limited intergenerational skill-
transmission, which increases the responsiveness of the value function to the human capital state.
23The value function and decision rules reported in this section are calculated at the equilibria of
the model economies at different tax rates. In order words, the aggregate human capital (H) and
public education (E) arguments of optimal education rules (ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, τ)) and value functions
(V (h, ξ;H,E, τ)) are competitive equilibrium objects.
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public education at the laissez-faire economy, thus no extensive margin decision)
occurs at the kink point. Solving for all other tax rates reveal that extensive margins
occur monotonically at higher human capital & inborn competence states as tax rate
and the consequent public education levels increase. Finally, as tax rate goes up,
private education choice decreases also in the intensive margin due to less disposable
income, as well as because of lower return on education due to the burden of taxes.
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Due to these features of the decision rules, it can be summarized that higher taxes
monotonically disincentivize private education both on the extensive and on the
intensive margin.
Table 1.7: Steady-State with Limited Public Education Spillover
τ H Y C C/Y E E E/E Pop.
E
0.00% 0.672 2.419 2.010 0.831 0.410 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
2.50% 0.630 2.324 1.941 0.835 0.383 0.058 15.17% 0.00%
4.78% 0.441 1.851 1.577 0.852 0.275 0.089 32.27% 28.34%
5.00% 0.427 1.814 1.548 0.853 0.266 0.091 34.12% 31.34%
7.50% 0.354 1.615 1.398 0.866 0.216 0.121 55.99% 59.22%
10.00% 0.353 1.618 1.408 0.871 0.209 0.162 77.25% 78.99%
11.78% 0.343 1.593 1.393 0.875 0.200 0.188 93.90% 94.63%
12.50% 0.353 1.625 1.419 0.873 0.207 0.203 98.34% 98.64%
15.00% 0.544 2.131 1.812 0.850 0.320 0.320 100.00% 100.00%
Note: All variables are in per-capita terms. H denotes average human capital, Y denotes average output, C
denotes average consumption,E denotes public education provision, E = E +
∫
H×Ξ e(h, ξ;H,E, τ) dµ(h, ξ;H,E, τ)
denotes average per-capita expenditure on education, and Pop.
E
denotes the fraction of population who attends
public schools.
Table 1.7 displays the behavior of aggregate variables under different tax
regimes. Last three columns of Table 1.7 show that level of public education, share
of public education in total education expenditure and share of population attend-
ing public schools are monotonically increasing in the tax rate, as expected. First
three columns, however, reveal a different pattern: as economy’s tax rate goes up,
average human capital, output, consumption, and total education first decrease, and
after a threshold they all start to increase. This U-shaped behavior can be observed
more explicitly in Figure 1.5. The threshold tax rate where aggregate variables are
minimized is roughly at τ = 11.5%, which is slightly below the tax rate at which
whole population chooses to attend only public education, i.e. 12.5%.
A brief explanation on why the U-shaped pattern of the aggregate variables
over taxes is present is as follows: starting from the laissez-faire economy, as the tax
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rate goes up, four factors are in effect, three of which are working against and one
of which is working in favor of the aggregate variables: First, as a result of a higher
tax rate, disposable incomes of the households decrease, which reduces the preferred
private education choice of agents in the intensive margin. This effect applies to
those middle-aged agents who still choose to bequeath private education to their
kids, yet only at lower levels due to higher taxes.24 Second, there is a disincentivizing
extensive margin effect due to the level of public education. To exemplify this effect,
suppose in the absence of a public education provision of 1 unit, middle-aged agent




1−ρ(1−ε)γ < 0 as long as skill transmission and discount factor coefficients are lower than 1.
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i chooses to bequeath 2 units of private education to his offspring. In the presence
of 1 unit of public education provision, instead of paying the full private education
cost of 2 units and benefitting from a total of 2+1×ν = 2.5, the middle-aged agent
optimally chooses to go for the public education level of 1 unit in order not bear the
private financing cost and still enjoy a reasonable amount education. The presence of
public education causes a decrease in the level of total education attained due to the
extensive margin decisions of individuals whose optimal private education choices
would have been in the close neighborhood above the public education level. Third,
there is distortion to human capital investment caused by lower return on education:
compared to a low tax environment, under a high tax regime the same level of
education generates equal pre-tax output, but less post-tax disposable income, which
accordingly discourages education attainment due to lower returns. These three
effects, due to reducing private educational attainment, cause aggregate education
in the economy to decrease, which in turn reduces the level of aggregate human
capital; and given that production takes place with human capital and fixed labor
only, lower aggregate human capital translates into lower output and consumption.
The fourth effect, which works in favor of the aggregate variables is due to the
extensive margin choice of the poor and the public education spillover to the private
school students: those who would choose a private education bequest below the
public education level in the absence of public education optimally choose public
education when it is available. Accordingly, the presence of public education make
the poor better off by enabling them attain better education through their extensive
margin decision, which in turn increases aggregate education, human capital, output
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and consumption. Also, private school students enjoy increase in total education
attained in the presence of public education spillovers. All these four effects are
amplified by the presence of complementarities in the economy.
When there are no public education benefits to private school students, i.e.
when ν = 0, and economy-wide complementarities are not strong enough, unless the
whole population attends public schools, the former three negative effects dominate
the positive one. The intuition behind this result can be described as follows: sup-
pose the economy is initially at the minimum tax rate at which whole population
attends public education. If the tax rate decreases by an infinitesimal amount, some
small measure of the population chooses to exit the public education pool, and at-
tend private education. At this slightly lower tax rate, the private education they
prefer needs to be noticeably higher than the public education level so that they
would be willing to bear full cost their private of education choice. Then, those who
choose to bequeath private education would increase total education attainment in
the economy, which in turn increases economy’s aggregate human capital, and out-
put. As tax rate goes down, there is also a negative effect in act: due to the lower
tax revenue, public education provision goes down, which reduces the education at-
tainment of a major fraction of the population attending public education. However,
since tax decreases only marginally, and those who switch to private education still
keep funding the public education system anyway, the drop in public education level
is negligibly small, and is more than offset by the increase in the private education
attainment of the rich. As a result of these channels, aggregate education increases
as tax rate drops from the threshold tax rate at which public school attendance
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reaches 100%. As total education goes up, so does aggregate human capital and
output. On the opposite direction, if the tax rate increases beyond the threshold
rate, public education level goes up, and since there is no change on the extensive
margin decisions of individuals, aggregate education increases, which in turn boosts
human capital and output.25 When there is public education spillover, i.e. ν > 0,
the tax rate which minimizes aggregate output is no longer the tax regime where
all students choose to attend public schools, but one at which there is still a large
measure of households attending public schools. This result is mainly because of
the fact that with public education spillovers the opportunity cost of forgoing public
education for private school students gets smaller as public education spillover goes
up. For the limited-spillover model where the spillover rate is 50%, beyond the tax
rate where roughly 60% of agents attend public education, the two competing forces
are roughly equivalent in magnitude so that aggregate macro variables stay almost
constant for a noticeable tax range.
Because of the aforementioned effects, in the presence of distortionary taxes to
finance public education and presence of economy-wide complementarities, in order
to maximize aggregate output, a social planner needs to either set the tax rate to
0% or high enough (e.g. beyond 12.5%) so that the complementarity effects can
dominate the distortion due to taxes and disincentivizing role of public education
25When the whole population attends public schools, with no intergenerational skill transmission,




dµ)1/ετΥ where Υ is a positive constant. Since beyond the threshold tax rate at which all students
choose public education, distribution of human capital across individuals do not change substan-
tially in terms of higher moments, by looking at the implicit characterization equation, one can
show that aggregate human capital increases in taxes.
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provision.26 Hence, a normative conclusion of the model is that instead of design-
ing an education system where both public and private education are chosen by
large measures of households, or taking the “middle road”, it is aggregate-variable-
enhancing to rely extensively on either of the two types of educations.
In Table 1.7’s third row where the economy is under the constant 4.78% tax
rate regime, the share of public education expenditure to total education expenditure
is 32.27% and in the seventh row where there tax rate is 11.78%, the corresponding
share of public education expenditure is 93.90%. These public education ratios
are the ones seen in data for the U.S. and the Nordic average, and therefore they
are the model economies calibrated to match the U.S. and Nordic average targets,
respectively.
Next, I focus on distributional properties the model generates under different
tax regimes, and display my findings in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8: Distributional Properties with Limited Public Education Spillover
τ GINIh GINIy GINIc GINIe
0.00% 0.400 0.265 0.266 0.264
2.50% 0.400 0.266 0.262 0.263
4.78% 0.414 0.276 0.251 0.330
5.00% 0.414 0.276 0.249 0.332
7.50% 0.410 0.272 0.239 0.298
10.00% 0.400 0.264 0.239 0.194
11.77% 0.389 0.258 0.249 0.063
12.50% 0.382 0.253 0.251 0.017
15.00% 0.379 0.252 0.252 0.000
26As the tax rate goes up beyond 11.5%, aggregate output keeps increasing, which is due to the
inelastic labor supply and absence of physical capital. In fact, as the tax rate goes up, economic
theory suggests that due to the distortion on the labor wedge, labor supply should decrease and
punitive taxes should discourage physical capital accumulation, as well as motivate the escape of
physical capital to international markets for open economies. Endogenous labor, which is studied
in the next section, is verified limit the production growth over taxes, yet in the absence of physical
capital, the predictions for taxes beyond which there is already uniform public education attendance
should be taken with a grain of salt.
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Results from the calculated the gini coefficients of the variables of interest
suggest that as tax rate goes up, so does inequality in human capital, output and
education, up to a threshold tax rate of 5%, and vice versa beyond this rate so that
there is an inverted U-shaped pattern. For human capital and output, gini coeffi-
cients stay constant only after the whole young population attends public schools,
and for education since everyone attends only public schools so that there are no
disparities across households, the education gini drops to zero. Regarding the in-
equality in consumption, results suggest there is not much variation over tax rates,
and the U-shape pattern is not carried over to consumption much. This finding can
be attributed to the following dynamics: as tax rate goes up, a significant fraction
of people start to attend public education, whose education attainment is signifi-
cantly lower than that of the private education average. Thus, those choosing public
education have lower human capital endowments, which induce them produce less,
thereby increases inequality output and consumption. At the same time, as the
rich middle-aged choose high levels of private education for their kids, they incur
higher costs of education financing, which they have to pay out of their disposable
income, contrary to those who choose public schools. That the rich pay higher abso-
lute amounts of taxes and private education costs therefore moderate consumption
inequality. Further, as tax rate gets high enough so that everyone attends pub-
lic education, consumption becomes only a fraction of output, and inequality in
consumption remains similar to the inequality in output.
To show the impact of taxes on inequality, I display the Lorenz curves of edu-
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cation under different tax regimes in Figure 1.6.27 As mentioned earlier, Figure 1.6
verifies inequality in education first increases over taxes, and starts to diminish only
after a threshold around 5%. These findings are in accordance with higher income
and educational inequality predictions of the U.S. when compared to the Nordic
European countries, and suggest that contrary to what has been put forward in the
literature, public education does not monotonically translate into less inequality.
Figure 1.6: Lorenz Curves for Education Under Different Tax Regimes






































Since the prime motivation of this chapter is to establish a model that can
deliver the aforementioned differences between the U.S. and the Nordic countries,
next I compare the predictions of the model with the data, and summarize my
findings in Table 1.9.
At their respective public-to-total-education ratios, the model predicts the
27Other variables of interest also display similar Lorenz curve patterns as education, only with
less pronounced variations in magnitude. The intuition behind lower inequality differences of these
variables over tax rates can be summarized as follows: first, individual human capital depends also
on factors other than education, such as aggregate human capital, parental human capital and
competence shocks, therefore elasticity of human capital with respect to education defines how
much variation in human capital be traced to educational differences. Second, the model currently
assumes that the labor is fixed, which moderates variation in production for the given output
technology, and accordingly less variant income translates into less variant consumption.
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Table 1.9: Fit of Model’s Predictions with the Data









U.S. 32.27% 4.78% 100% 100% 14.83% 28% 0.33
Nordic Aver. 93.90% 11.78% 86% 211% 12.54% 95% 0.06
Data
U.S. 32.27% 12.87% 100% 100% 3.10% 67% N/A (+)
Nordic Aver. 93.90% 20.92% 87% 155% 1.60% 89% N/A (−)
Note: Y denotes output per capita, E denotes public education expenditure, E denotes total expenditure on
education, τ denotes taxes on income and profits as a percentage of GDP, and Pop.
E
denotes share of population
who attend public education.
Scandinavian per-capita output to be 86% of the U.S. and the OECD database
suggests approximately the same ratio. In this regard, the model can deliver the
respective per-capita income level ratio with a high precision after calibration. While
the tax rate on income and profits in Nordic average is roughly double that of the
U.S. rate in the data, so is approximately the ratio predicted by the model. Further,
whereas the data suggests that the public education expenditure per student in
Nordic countries is significantly higher than the U.S. in absolute terms, 155% to be
exact, the model makes a similar qualitative prediction, only with an overshooting
ratio of 211%. Moreover, what we see in the data is that, the U.S. spends more
on higher education, and lower fraction of students attend public schools in the
U.S. Although not up to scale, the model delivers the same results qualitatively.28
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that the inequality in educational attainment
in the U.S. is noticeably greater than those of the Scandinavian countries, and the
model provides the same distributional predictions. Therefore, it can be argued that
the model can generate results that can deliver many of the observed discrepancies
28The order of magnitude difference in education spending ratio in the model compared to the
data can be attributed to the fact that the model features only a single type of education, and
therefore does not distinguish between the primary and secondary education or the participation
rate.
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by relating only to differences in taxes.
Another merit of the model is on how well it fits not only for the calibration
targets, but also for other developed economies. To show model’s fit to the data, I
do the following exercise: I sort the OECD countries whose data is available with
respect to their public-to-total-higher-education ratios in ascending order, and plot
them jointly with their GDP (PPP) per-capita levels. I also add these countries’
taxes on income and profits and total tax revenues as percentages of the respective
GDPs, and display the resultant graphs in Figure 1.7.29
First, there is a noticeable, yet slightly-distorted U-shaped pattern of per-
capita output over public education shares, as in the benchmark results. I derive
and plot also the filtered per-capita output series, which display the U-shape more
clearly. I depict also tax rate trends, and show that aside from minor fluctuations,
tax shares of countries tend to increase when public-to-total education shares go up,
although total-tax-revenue-to-GDP ratio acting more in accordance than the taxes-
on-income-and-profits-to GDP ratio. A simple ordinary least squares estimation of
public education share on a constant and total tax ratio reveals that public education
ratio is positively and significantly predicted by the tax rate for the linear equation
of the form: Ei
Ei
= −0.149 + 2.354τi with a probability value of p = 0.0011 for
the coefficient before total tax rate. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the
U-shaped pattern generated by the model over taxes is also observable in data.
29Given that developed countries differ substantially in terms of to their tax systems by the use
of very complicated tax elements and instruments, such as tax brackets, tax deductable incomes
and expenditures, progressivity of different magnitudes, etc., instead of ranking countries with
respect to their tax rates, I sort them with respect to their public-to-total education shares, which
is a more objective and standardized measure across countries and is an endogenous outcome of
the model.
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Source: OECD Tax Revenue Database, 2008.
Next I compare how well results generated by the model fit to the data. First,
I interpolate the results for the limited number of tax rates and get finer measures,
then I match interpolated economies to the OECD economies listed in Figure 1.7
with respect to their public-to-total higher education expenditure shares. I normal-
ize the U.S. per-capita output to the correspondent equilibrium per-capita output
in the model, and display in Figure 1.8 model’s predictions on per-capita output at
different tax rates jointly with the figures from the data.
It can be seen from the graph that both the model and data illustrate a de-
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Source: OECD Tax Revenue Database, 2008.
creasing per-capita output pattern over public-to-total education expenditure ratio,
and if the filtered GDP per-capita is compared to the predictions by the model, it
is noticeable that both reach their respective minimum around 60% share, although
the minimum generated by the model is much more prolonged and lies above than
what the data suggests. Even though not to up scale, the model succeeds to generate
the left arm pattern of the U-shape fairly well. Beyond 60% public education ratio,
whereas the model suggests roughly a constant output per-capita prediction for a
wide tax range, there is a clear upward pattern in the filtered series. The noticeable
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portion of the right arm of the U-shape generated by the model starts only after
Denmark, or roughly 96% public expenditure share, and keeps steadily increasing
beyond this point as shown in Figure 1.5. Overall, it can be concluded that while
the model succeeds to capture the initially-decreasing left arm in data fairly well, it
does not have a good fit for the increasing right arm.30
In the next subsection, I present comparative statics with alternative param-
eter values to illustrate how different channels affect benchmark results.31
1.4.2 Comparative Statics with Limited Public Education Spillover
1.4.2.1 Absence of Idiosyncratic Shocks
In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. σ2ξ = 0, all households become identical,
therefore the model transforms into a representative-agent model and the stationary
values of all macro variables decrease substantially at all tax rates, as displayed in
Table 1.10.
In essence, this result is comparable in spirit to the well-known “precautionary
saving” phenomenon: when there is uncertainty on the inborn competence of future
30In regards to the loose fit of the economies on the right arm, it is probable that identical public
education spillover imposition by the model for countries whose actual public education spillover
rates are likely to differ might contribute to the poor goodness of fit. One could expect that a
country where the only type of universities is free public schools to have a high spillover rate, as in
Scandinavia, and a country where half of the higher education expenditure is on private education
to have a comparably low spillover rate, as in Portugal. Results in the following subsections
with different spillover rates show that high spillover values can generate higher per-capita output
predictions at the same tax regimes, thus potentially improving models’ fit on the right arm by
the use of alternative parametrization. Lack of earlier studies on micro-level evidence admittedly
limit the reliability of the predictions by the model.
31I analyze and document similar qualitatively comparative statics results for the models with
different spillover values. I omit comparative statics results of the two polar specifications for
brevity.
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Table 1.10: Steady-State with No Idiosyncratic Shocks (σ2ξ = 0)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.140 0.967 0.797 0.170 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.112 0.838 0.703 0.135 0.040 29.62% 0.00%
11.78% 0.046 0.480 0.424 0.056 0.056 100.00% 100.00%
15.00% 0.094 0.752 0.639 0.113 0.113 100.00% 100.00%
Note: The results presented in this table, as well as Table 1.11-1.15 are of the model with limited public education
spillover. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for the other two model specifications.
generations, middle-aged find it optimal to accumulate “precautionary human cap-
ital”, some fraction of which they could pass to the next generations in the absence
of physical capital. Accordingly, when there are no future shocks, middle-aged find
it optimal to reduce education, which results in lower human capital accumulation,
and accordingly output and consumption. Since the absence of uncertainty also re-
moves heterogeneity, the fraction of population acquiring public education is either
zero (at low tax rates) or unity (at high enough tax rates). The U-shape of the
aggregate variables is preserved since the same competing effects are still in act.32
1.4.2.2 Higher Return on Education
When the elasticity of human capital with respect to education increases by 10%,
i.e. ε = 0.33, levels of all aggregate variables at same tax rates increase, as shown
in Table 1.11.33
From the middle-aged agent’s point of view, education is a choice variable, as
32If agents have lasting “intelligence types”, i.e. all agents in a dynasty have the same inborn
competence draws at all times so that heterogeneity is preserved but future uncertainty is revoked,
absence of precautionary human capital saving still causes a negative level shift in macro variables
as in the representative-agent case.
33For this and next two experiments, note that the law of motion for human capital is homoge-
nous of degree one in education, intergenerational skill transmission and economy-wide comple-
mentarity, which implies that an increase in one of the parameters would imply a drop in the
parameter values for the remaining ones.
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Table 1.11: Steady-State with Higher Return of Education (ε = 0.33)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.770 2.632 2.145 0.488 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.544 2.107 1.759 0.349 0.101 28.90% 21.55%
11.78% 0.386 1.712 1.478 0.234 0.202 86.07% 87.65%
15.00% 0.495 2.011 1.709 0.302 0.302 100.00% 100.00%
opposed to intergenerational skill transmission or economy-wide complementarity,
which they he takes as given in his optimization. Therefore, higher return of educa-
tion on human capital accumulation encourages the middle-aged to bequeath more
education to their offsprings, which causes a level shift in aggregate variables at all
tax rates. Further, since education is more effective under this scenario, increases
in the tax rate does not discourage middle-aged from attaining private education
as much as in the benchmark case, therefore a lower measure of the population
chooses public education over the private one in response to the same incremental
tax increases. As a result, while the U-shape is preserved, the threshold tax rate
at which everyone uniformly attends public schools is beyond 13%, compared to
approximately 12.5% in the benchmark case.
1.4.2.3 Absence of Aggregate Complementarity
Absence of economy-wide complementarity of aggregate human capital, i.e. γ = 1,
induces higher persistence in individual human capital levels. In the presence of
aggregate human capital externalities, when average human capital is high, return
on education gets higher, which in turn motivates middle-aged to bequeath more
education, inducing even higher average human capital levels in the economy. In the
absence of complementarities, there is greater intergenerational skill-transmission,
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and given that idiosyncratic shocks do not change the level of average productivity
in the economy, stronger parental transmission cannot deliver the same amplifica-
tion effect as the aggregate human capital externalities. Further, more pronounced
parental human capital transmission reduces future uncertainty, thus diminishing
precautionary human capital savings. Therefore, lack of economy-wide complemen-
tarity causes the dismissal of the aforementioned amplification effect and reducing
precautionary human capital accumulation, thereby pushing down macro variables
at all tax rates, as illustrated in Table 1.12.
Table 1.12: Steady-State with No Aggregate Complementarity (γ = 1)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.431 1.646 1.111 0.535 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.381 1.505 1.047 0.458 0.072 15.72% 16.47%
11.78% 0.258 1.156 0.844 0.312 0.136 43.61% 59.58%
15.00% 0.226 1.072 0.791 0.281 0.161 57.24% 72.35%
Also, the absence of complementarities causes weaker responses of aggregate
variables to incremental increases in tax rates due to the lack of amplification mech-
anism, and this moves the output minimizing tax rate to show up at a point far
beyond τ = 15, around 30% to be exact. Accordingly, at the tax rate of τ = 15,
only 72.35% of the population chooses public education.
1.4.2.4 Absence of Intergenerational Skill Transmission
No transmission of skills across generations, i.e. γ = 0, implies stronger comple-
mentarity effect of aggregate human capital in the economy, which induces opposite
results compared to the absence of complementarity exercise. Individual responses
are amplified through the presence of high degree of externalities, which causes a
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Table 1.13: Steady-State with No Intergenerational Skill Transmission (γ = 0)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.971 3.060 2.600 0.460 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.584 2.219 1.934 0.285 0.106 37.21% 35.55%
11.78% 0.614 2.303 2.032 0.271 0.271 100.00% 100.00%
15.00% 1.172 3.449 2.931 0.517 0.517 100.00% 100.00%
positive level shift in macro variables, as shown in Table 1.13.
The same amplification mechanism causes arms of the U-shape to be steeper
while preserving the U-shape. Due to the steeper left arm, the aggregate-output-
minimizing tax rate is observed be around 9.4% compared to 11.5% in the benchmark
case, and the tax rate at which the entire population attends public schools occurs
at a tax rate below 12.5%.
1.4.2.5 Lower Labor Supply
As briefly mentioned earlier, economic theory suggests that an increase in the dis-
tortionary tax rate is expected to reduce labor supplied by middle-aged agents.
Further, there is a growing literature on why Americans supply more labor than
Europeans.34. In light of these insights and evidences, I conduct the experiment of
deriving the stationary-equilibria with a 10% lower inelastic labor supply, l = 0.297.
Although a lower fixed labor supply might initially be thought as a negative shift in
the technology parameter which clearly diminishes the levels of aggregate variables,
the non-trivial aspect of this exercise is that lower fixed supply would also imply
greater time devoted on parental education of the young through 1 − l, thereby
increasing the effectiveness of education on human capital.
34Among others, see Alesina et al. (2005), and Prescott (2004).
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Table 1.14: Steady-State with Lower Labor Supply (l = 0.297)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.645 2.266 1.882 0.384 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.426 1.741 1.483 0.258 0.083 32.22% 27.80%
11.78% 0.330 1.495 1.308 0.187 0.176 93.99% 94.95%
15.00% 0.523 2.001 1.700 0.300 0.300 100.00% 100.00%
As it can be seen in Table 1.14, with the benchmark parameters, the negative
effect dominates the positive one in equilibrium, and there is a negative level shift
at all tax rates while the U-shape of macro variables is preserved.
1.4.2.6 Persistent Inborn Productivity Shocks
While economists model inborn competence shocks in a non-persistent log-normal
way, mostly due to general equilibrium concerns (e.g. Benabou, 2000, 2005; Zhang,
2005), geneticists show that heritability of IQ in the U.S. is measured to differ
between 0.40 to 0.80 (e.g. Plomin et al., 1994). In light of such evidence, I model
innate competence shock as a first-order autoregressive stochastic process as follows:
log ξit+1 = κ log ξ
i
t + ut+1 (1.26)








so that both specifications have the same
mean and variance. I set the value of the autoregressive coefficient to a positive
constant κ = 0.40, and report the results in Table 1.15.
My findings reveal that while the U-shape is preserved, there is a significant
drop in the levels of aggregate variables at all tax rates, as displayed in Table
1.15. When inborn competence shocks are persistent, a middle-aged agent with
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Table 1.15: Steady-State with Persistent Inborn Shocks (κ = 0.40, σ2ξ = 1.19)
τ H Y C E E E/E %Pop.
E
0.00% 0.078 0.605 0.500 0.106 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
4.78% 0.063 0.531 0.450 0.080 0.025 31.68% 31.08%
11.78% 0.051 0.463 0.395 0.068 0.054 80.34% 83.88%
15.00% 0.068 0.558 0.469 0.089 0.084 94.04% 94.60%
a low competence draw is likely to have a child with a low competence draw, as
well. Especially, if his disposable income is also low due to limited human capital
endowment, he would not be motivated to bequeath a high level of education to
his offspring since next generations’ competence draws are likely to be low, thus
education bequests will contribute only marginally. For those with high inborn
competence draws, since future generations are likely to have good draws as well, too
much education bequests are not vital, which induces lower degrees of precautionary
human capital accumulation. As a result of these forces, lower educational bequests
dampen the level of aggregate human capital, and together with its complementarity
effect, return on education gets even lower, further amplifying the negative level
shifts of aggregate variables at all tax rates.35
For the remaining parameters, I verify that increasing the share of human
capital in the production function, i.e. λ, and the altruistic discount rate, i.e. ρ,
boost the level of aggregate variables at all tax rates while preserving the U-shaped
pattern.
Next, I show how results vary with different public education spillovers by
focusing on the two polar cases.
35Note that persistent inborn competence shocks imply stronger intergenerational transmission
channels, since parental transmission of human capital is still present.
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1.4.3 Results with No Public Education Spillover
In this subsection, I report and discuss about the results from the model with no
public education spillover, i.e. the environment in which students who attend private
schools cannot benefit from the provision of public education, at all. Again, value
functions and optimal decision rules are confirmed to be smooth and concave in
both dimensions. Further, extensive margin decisions for the non-zero tax rates
are observed to display sharper jumps compared to the limited-public-education-
spillover model. This result is due to the presence of even greater opportunity costs
of private education in the absence of public education spillovers: when students
attend private schools, their parents not only have to bear the full costs of private
education, but also they consider the additional costs of giving up all the benefits
from the provision of public education. For those middle-aged agents who choose
to bequeath private education for their offsprings, benefits from choosing private
education must exceed the sum of the two costs, which is greater than benchmark
specification, thereby causing even more distinct jumps in the optimal education
decision rules on the extensive margin.
Table 1.16 summarizes the results from the model under different tax regimes.
The first three and the fifth columns display comparable findings as the benchmark
model. Aggregate variables display a U-shaped pattern, although the arms being
steeper and the depth of the U-shape being greater than the former model. Figure
1.9 facilitates the display of this pattern.
This result can also be attributed to the greater forgone benefits of public
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Table 1.16: Steady-State with No Public Education Spillover (ν = 0)
τ H Y C C/Y E E E/E Pop.
E
0.00% 0.672 2.419 2.010 0.831 0.410 0.000 0.000% 0.000%
2.50% 0.612 2.279 1.905 0.836 0.374 0.057 15.224% 2.151%
5.00% 0.312 1.486 1.287 0.866 0.199 0.074 37.253% 46.853%
7.50% 0.248 1.292 1.140 0.882 0.152 0.097 63.591% 73.419%
10.00% 0.207 1.165 1.043 0.896 0.122 0.117 95.768% 97.557%
12.50% 0.334 1.573 1.376 0.875 0.197 0.197 100.000% 100.000%
15.00% 0.544 2.132 1.813 0.850 0.320 0.320 100.000% 100.000%
education when private education is chosen, hence less de facto education attain-
ment at all tax rates, except for the tax regimes at which all students attend either
only public or only private schools. The tax rate that minimizes aggregate output
emerges approximately at 10.2% beyond which the whole population starts uni-
formly attending public schools. Output minimizing public education share in the
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data was shown to be roughly 60%, hence the absence of public education spillover
suggests somewhat unrealistic and counterintuitive predictions as model’s goodness
of fit with the real the world evidence worsen compared to the limited-spillover
model.
Table 1.17: Distributional Properties with No Public Education Spillover
τ GINIh GINIy GINIc GINIe
0.00% 0.400 0.266 0.265 0.264
2.50% 0.402 0.267 0.258 0.273
5.00% 0.421 0.281 0.251 0.372
7.50% 0.409 0.270 0.246 0.286
10.00% 0.387 0.257 0.253 0.041
12.50% 0.379 0.252 0.252 0.000
15.00% 0.379 0.252 0.252 0.000
Next, I analyze the distributional properties of the variables of interest and
summarize the results in Table 1.17. First, second and fourth columns reveal that
similar to the limited-spillover model, human capital, output and education inequal-
ities first increase as economy’s tax rate goes up, and after a threshold tax rate of
5%, they all start to decrease, as in the limited-spillover model. However, inequality
measures are documented to vary more in magnitude over taxes compared to the
former model, which is due to the greater variation of fundamental variables un-
der the no-spillover specification. Third column shows that consumption inequality
across individuals behave similarly as in the benchmark model, both in terms of its
pattern and its magnitude. Inequality in consumption initially decreases over tax
rates, and after the tax rate at which the entire population attends public schools,
it stabilizes. Overall, it can be concluded that distributional properties of the macro
variables in the no-spillover model closely mimic those of the limited-spillover model,
while magnitude-wise the latter model generates more pronounced variations.
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1.4.4 Results with Full Public Education Spillover
In this subsection, I report the results from the model with full public education
spillover, i.e. the environment in which all students, regardless of their education
choice, can benefit fully from the public education provision. First, I verify that
the value functions and optimal decision rules are smooth and concave, as in the
earlier specifications. Contrary to the two former models, however, for the non-zero
tax rates at which some measure of individuals finds it optimal to attend public
schools under zero and limited spillover specifications, there are not any distinct
jumps in the extensive margin (e.g. as in Figure 1.4), but smooth transitions. This
result is due to the fact that, under the full-spillover model, the choice of private
education, even at an infinitesimal level, does not require giving up the benefit from
the provision of public education, and the only cost of private education is the actual
expenditure itself.
Table 1.18: Steady-State with Full Public Education Spillover (ν = 1)
τ H Y C C/Y E E E/E Pop.
E
0.00% 0.672 2.419 2.010 0.831 0.410 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
2.50% 0.633 2.330 1.947 0.836 0.383 0.058 15.20% 0.00%
5.00% 0.597 2.245 1.887 0.840 0.358 0.112 31.32% 0.00%
7.50% 0.567 2.175 1.837 0.845 0.338 0.163 48.26% 9.28%
10.00% 0.593 2.238 1.889 0.844 0.349 0.224 64.06% 30.43%
12.50% 0.677 2.436 2.040 0.837 0.396 0.304 76.89% 45.31%
15.00% 0.810 2.729 2.256 0.827 0.473 0.409 86.56% 59.09%
Table 1.18 displays the behavior of aggregate variables over taxes. The first
three and the fifth columns reveal that similar to the limited-spillover model, there
is a U-shaped pattern, although considerably flatter in magnitude. The minimum
levels of aggregate variable levels are noticeably higher than those of the two former
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models. Whereas the laissez-faire economy is identical to the former model case, as
it should be, in response to higher taxes only minor incremental drops in aggregate
variables are observed. Further, beyond the tax rate at which aggregate output is
minimized, τ ≈ 8%, the full-spillover model predicts higher aggregate variable levels
compared to the former two models. These results can be expected since the de facto
education attainment of the young is increasing over public education spillovers.
The last three columns of Table 1.18 show that while the level of public edu-
cation is greater in magnitude compared to the former two models in all tax regimes
(except for the laissez-faire case), the share of public sources in overall education
expenditure and the fraction of population attending only public schools are much
lower. Specifically, under this specification, no one chooses only public education
unless the tax rate exceeds 6%. Also, while the entire population attends public
schools in the no-spillover model when the tax rate is 10.2%, only one-third of the
population prefer only public education in this model environment. This prediction
by the model can again be attributed to the lower opportunity cost of forgoing pri-
vate education. Quantitative details of the behavior of aggregate variables can be
examined in detail in Figure 1.10.
Table 1.19 displays the distributional properties of interest over tax rates. The
gini coefficients of aggregate human capital and output stay roughly the same up to
τ = 7.5%, and they start to decrease beyond this tax rate. Further, the gini coef-
ficients of consumption and education are observed to decrease monotonically over
tax rates contrary to the earlier two models. Therefore, it could be concluded that
the model with full public education spillover predicts monotonically less unequal
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distributions of fundamental variables over tax rates, as in the earlier studies in the
literature that do not study the co-existence of education types.36
Table 1.19: Distributional Properties with Full Public Education Spillover
τ GINIh GINIy GINIc GINIe
0.00% 0.400 0.265 0.266 0.264
2.50% 0.401 0.266 0.259 0.261
5.00% 0.401 0.267 0.253 0.257
7.50% 0.401 0.267 0.246 0.249
10.00% 0.398 0.264 0.243 0.210
12.50% 0.392 0.260 0.242 0.155
15.00% 0.387 0.257 0.243 0.100
36Although the model with full public education spillover generates admittedly unrealistic predic-
tions, a promising merit it provides is that it suggests alternative country-specific parametrization
could enhance model’s goodness of fit on the right arm of the U-shape, particularly for the countries
which rely extensively on public education.
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Per Capita Output in the Model with No Public Education Spillover
Per Capita Output in the Model with Full Public Education Spillover





A comparison of the output per-capita by the three specifications is displayed
in Figure 1.11. The laissez-faire economies of the three models are identical since
different ways of modeling public education spillover does not alter the results in an
environment at which the provision of public education is zero. As tax rate goes up,
the no-spillover model generates the lowest and the full-spillover model generates
the highest per-capita output. The limited spillover model lies in between the two
polar specifications up to the tax rate τ ≈ 12.5% at which the entire population
attends only public schools. Beyond this tax rate, since all students choose only
public schools in both the no-spillover and the limited-spillover specifications, the
two models converge. The intuition behind this result is similar in spirit to the
laissez-faire case: given that at the convergent model environments there is only
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public de facto educational attainment, modeling how public education provision
affects private school students has no effect in equilibrium. At this tax rate only
half of the students attend public education under the full-spillover environment.
The three models converge when the entire population in the full-spillover model
attends only public schools, which emerges at an unrealistically high tax rate.
1.4.5 Results with Endogenous Labor
Having established results under the fixed-labor-supply specification, next I turn
to relaxing the restrictive assumption on labor choice and analyze the consequent
changes. In order to endogenize labor, first I modify the utility function of the
middle-aged by employing the following functional form:




Next, I set ω = 0.5 so that Frisch elasticity of labor supply equals 2 as in the
mainstream macro literature. I calibrate the multiplier before disutility of labor to
φ = 2.138 so that the average labor supply in the endogenous labor model at the
laissez-faire economy equals l = 0.33, as in the fixed-labor model. Also, I keep
ν = 0.5 so that the results are comparable to the limited public education spillover
model, which fits the data better among the three specifications.
I verify the value functions and optimal decision rules for education to be
smooth and concave as before. I also document distinct jumps in the private educa-
tion extensive margin for the non-zero tax rates, as in the fixed-labor specification.
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Further, for the non-zero tax rates, labor supply decision is documented to illus-
trate minor jumps: the middle-aged agents who choose public education for their
offsprings supply lower labor than those who choose private education, however
variation across individuals with different extensive margin decisions for a given tax
rate is observed to not to be substantial. Also, labor supply variation within the
intensive margin is documented to be minimal, as well. This result that less pro-
ductive individuals with convex distaste in labor work less than their productive
counterparts is in accordance with economic theory.
Table 1.20: Steady-State of the Model with Endogenous Labor
τ H Y C C/Y L E E E/E Pop.
E
0.00% 0.698 2.477 2.052 0.828 0.330 0.425 0.000 0.00% 0.00%
2.50% 0.657 2.378 1.980 0.833 0.326 0.398 0.059 14.94% 0.00%
4.89% 0.458 1.871 1.590 0.850 0.315 0.281 0.091 32.26% 29.08%
5.00% 0.443 1.834 1.559 0.850 0.315 0.275 0.092 33.36% 30.33%
7.50% 0.363 1.604 1.385 0.863 0.306 0.219 0.120 54.87% 59.05%
10.00% 0.359 1.587 1.376 0.867 0.300 0.211 0.159 75.25% 77.21%
12.02% 0.346 1.544 1.345 0.871 0.296 0.199 0.187 93.83% 94.90%
12.50% 0.350 1.553 1.353 0.871 0.295 0.200 0.194 96.95% 97.53%
15.00% 0.520 1.988 1.690 0.850 0.295 0.298 0.298 100.00% 100.00%
Table 1.20 displays the behavior of aggregate variables over taxes. The pat-
tern illustrated by the variables of interest is identical to the fixed-labor model,
except for the aggregate labor supply which decreases monotonically over the tax
rate. This result is due to the fact that income tax creates an intratemporal wedge,
thereby distorting labor supply decisions. Another observation from the first row
of the table is that under the laissez-faire economy of the endogenous-labor-model,
although average labor is matched to the fixed-labor model, average human capi-
tal and average output are higher than those predicted by the fixed-labor model.
This result is due to the fact that with endogenous labor, middle-aged agents with
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high human capital endowments and inborn competence draws work more hours,
and the more productive labor force boosts overall human capital accumulation and
production even at the same average labor level as in the fixed-labor model. Another
observation from Table 1.20 is that the calibrated tax rates to match the U.S. and
Nordic countries are slightly higher than the predictions by the fixed-labor model,
although the differences being considerably slight and no more than 0.25% for both
of the calibration targets. Further details on the behavior of aggregate variables can
be examined in Figure 1.12.
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Next, I compare the behaviors of macro variables by the endogenous-labor
model to those from the fixed-labor model, and display my findings in Figure 1.13.
The first six graphs in Figure 1.13 reveal that predictions on all aggregate variables
but the total labor supply by the endogenous-labor model are higher at low tax
rates, and lower at the high tax regimes. This result is due to fact that higher
productivity of the endogenous-labor environment as a result of better allocation of
labor and education is more than offset by the fall in labor supply at high tax rates.
However, the differences in the aggregate variables are notably minor, and variables
in percentages (i.e. the share of public education and the fraction of public school
students) are almost identical for both of the models.
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The model predicts average labor supply in the U.S. to be 1.064 times higher
than that of the Nordic average. According to Alesina et al. (2005) in terms of
“usual” hours worked, which is defined as the most common weekly working sched-
ule over a selected period of a person in employment, U.S. employees work 1.047
times more than their Scandinavian counterparts. If the total hours worked, which
accounts also for unemployment, is considered, this ratio goes up to as high as 1.242.
Since the proposed model does not feature contractual employment or unemploy-
ment, the relative labor supply ratio generated by the model can be considered to
fit fairly well with the data by being located in the associated interval.
Table 1.21: Distributional Properties of the Model with Endogenous Labor
τ GINIh GINIy GINIc GINIe GINIl
0.00% 0.400 0.265 0.267 0.260 0.002
2.50% 0.400 0.266 0.268 0.256 0.003
4.89% 0.415 0.283 0.257 0.330 0.023
5.00% 0.414 0.282 0.256 0.330 0.023
7.50% 0.410 0.280 0.240 0.303 0.024
10.00% 0.400 0.271 0.237 0.204 0.017
12.02% 0.390 0.261 0.249 0.068 0.006
12.50% 0.385 0.256 0.251 0.027 0.003
15.00% 0.379 0.252 0.252 0.000 0.001
Table 1.21 shows the distributional properties of the model with endogenous
labor by focusing on the gini coefficients. Noticeably, the gini coefficients of human
capital, output, consumption and education under the endogenous labor specifi-
cation are almost identical to the predictions by the fixed-labor model at all tax
rates. Inequality in labor displays a similar U-shaped pattern as in human capi-
tal and output: as tax rate goes up, labor supply inequality initially increases and
starts to decrease beyond a threshold of 7.5%. This result is essentially due to the
aforementioned labor supply disparities among those who differ in terms of their
56
public versus private education choices, together with the phenomenon that more
productive workers supply more labor than their unproductive counterparts.
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the fixed-labor assumption does not
offer unrealistic predictions since key results of the model hold even with the fairly
restrictive constant labor assumption.
1.4.6 Welfare Analysis
Having derived the results on the behavior of aggregate variables and their dis-
tributional properties, next I focus on how agents’ welfare varies over taxes. For
this purpose, first I show the stationary distributions of households over individual
human capital and inborn competence states by the limited-spillover model for the
calibrated U.S. and the Nordic economies so as to examine how agents are populated.
Next, I illustrate individuals’ preferences over taxes by deriving their consumption
equivalent gains in different tax regimes.
In Figure 1.14 and 1.15, I illustrate how middle-aged agents are distributed
over human capital and inborn productivity states at the calibrated economies. I
also graph the respective average human capital levels of these model economies
as transparent light purple surfaces. It can be seen from the figures that in both
economies of interest, a predominant majority of the population is endowed with hu-
man capital endowment levels below the economy average, and a noticeable fraction
of agents is populated at the very low end of human capital states. Further, due to
the notable variance of the inborn competence shocks, a non-trivial fraction of the
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population is located around the upper and lower bounds of the inborn productivity
states. The log-normal distribution of the inborn competence shocks, together with
the optimal decision rules yield these results such that a majority of the population
has below-average human capital, and accordingly pre-tax income levels.
Figure 1.14: Stationary Distribution of the Calibrated U.S. Economy
Figure 1.15: Stationary Distribution of the Calibrated Scandinavian Economy
Next, I derive how aggregate consumption and a utilitarian welfare measure
calculated as the sum of dynastic utility levels of middle-aged agents weighted by
58
their respective population densities vary over taxes, and display my findings in Fig-
ure 1.16. Noticeably, the utilitarian welfare measure mimics aggregate consumption
and displays a U-shaped pattern over taxes as the other macro variables. Yet, it
would be erroneous to immediately conclude just by Figure 1.16 that the laissez-fair
or high tax rates Pareto-dominate policies in between the two polar cases. In fact,
next I show this is indeed not the case.
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I analyze how life-time utility levels of individuals vary over taxes at different
state pairs, and display the resultant graphs, together with a zero surface, in Figure
1.17 to 1.22. The former three figures display middle-aged agents’ consumption
equivalent gains over taxes for given levels of inborn competence, and the latter three
graphs display consumption equivalent gains for given levels of human capital.37
37The consumption equivalent gains in these graphs are calculated by the use of “equivalent
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Figure 1.17: Consumption Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes with the Lowest
Inborn Productivity State (ξ = 0.37)
Figure 1.18: Consumption-Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes with the Median
Inborn Productivity State (ξ = 1.00)
Figure 1.19: Consumption-Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes with the Highest
Inborn Productivity State (ξ = 2.72)
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A careful examination of Figure 1.17 to 1.19 reveals that similar to the behav-
ior of aggregate variables, welfare gains of agents for given inborn competence levels
display a U-shaped pattern over taxes, although with a minor yet critical novel fea-
ture: the middle-aged agents whose human capital endowments are low and inborn
competence draws are not very high are better off in a tax regime around 3.5%
compared to the laissez-faire economy, and the consumption equivalent gains of
those at the very low end of distribution are more pronounced than their productive
counterparts. Beyond this tax rate, welfare levels first decrease up of a tax rate of
roughly 11.5% and start to increase beyond this threshold. While minor differences
across states are noticeable, the spike on the left arm of the U-shaped pattern in
welfare gains is present for a non-trivial measure of states. For those at high human
capital and inborn competence states, intergenerational welfare initially decreases
over taxes and starts to increase after the same threshold tax rate, thereby display-
ing a standard U-shaped pattern over taxes, comparable to that of the aggregate
variables.
Figure 1.20 to 1.22 magnify this pattern from a different angle: keeping indi-
vidual human capital states constant, the figures illustrate consumption equivalence
gains of agents over taxes for given inborn competence levels. Figures reveal that
agents with the lowest human capital states enjoy the most pronounced welfare gains
from incremental increases in taxes from the laissez-faire economy, as well as from
switching to a high tax regime. As agents’ human capital endowments increase, their
variation”: in order to leave an individual at a particular state indifferent between switching
from the laissez-fair economy to another tax regime, how much more (or less) compensation as a
percentage of his laissez-faire consumption is to be made.
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Figure 1.20: Consumption-Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes When h = 0.05
Figure 1.21: Consumption-Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes When h = 0.15
Figure 1.22: Consumption-Equivalent Welfare Gains over Taxes When h = 0.35
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welfare gains from switching to the 3.5% tax regime from the laissez-faire economy
first diminish and eventually disappear, while high enough tax regimes still provide
comparable welfare levels as the 3.5% tax regime to most middle-aged households
with not too high human capital and/or inborn competence states.
The presence of double-peaked preferences in education types is not a novel
idea, but a highlighted phenomenon in the earlier microeconomics literature.38 The
intuition behind the double-peaked preferences of households over taxes can be
summarized briefly as follows: agents at the low end of the income distribution
prefer a non-zero tax regime to the laissez-faire economy due to the provision of
free public education provision, which is financed mostly by the well-endowed agents
in the economy. This redistributive benefit enjoyed by the less-endowed could be
considered as a variant of the well-known Meltzer and Richards (1981) effect.
However, these agents with limited human capital endowments care also about
the aggregate state of the economy since they use economy’s aggregate human capital
as a means to accumulate their offsprings’ human capital for their. Thus, on the
left arm of the U-shape, they want a non-zero tax regime in which the tax rate
is not too high that gains from the redistributive benefits of free public education
are not offset by the drop in aggregate human capital. Beyond this tax rate which
makes the less-endowed agents better off, further increases in the tax rate have
more marked negative effects on aggregate human capital, therefore benefits from
38For the introduction of single-dipped/double-peaked preferences in the presence of public and
private education, see Stiglitz (1974), and Barzel and Deacon (1975), and Flowers(1975). Note that
all the earlier papers that study the micro-foundations of double-peaked preferences are limited to
the investigation of endowment economies, and none of these studies concentrate on the interaction
of double-peaked preferences with endogenous aggregate outcomes.
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incremental increases in the public education provision are outweighed by the drops
in aggregate human capital.
Once the economy reaches a sufficiently high tax regime in which a major-
ity of the population chooses to attend public schools, drops in private education
attainment as a result of higher taxes is more than offset by the increase in total
public education attainment and its spillovers. Further, with the pronounced pos-
itive economy-wide complementarity effects, agents start to enjoy welfare gains to
increase over taxes again.
Clearly, the single-crossing property does not to hold globally in this model
environment. However, a weaker local variant of it is verified to hold around the two
peaks: the model numerically predicts that if an agent with the individual human
capital state (h1, ξj) prefers the tax rate τ = 3.5% over τ = 0, then so does the
agent with (h2, ξj) state pair where h1 > h2. Similarly, if a middle-aged household
with the human capital state (h1, ξj) prefers a tax rate above τ = 11.5%+ to one
below τ = 11.5 −%, then so does the individual with the (h2, ξj) state pair. Also,
while tax regimes below 3.5% offer higher dynastic utility than 11.5% for most of
the individuals, such comparison is not immediately applicable for tax rates close
to 15% from below, and a considerable heterogeneity in welfare gains is present.
If the tax rate in the economy is sufficiently close to τ = 3.5%, as in the case
for the calibrated U.S. economy, agents with limited human capital endowments
who constitute a majority of the population would object to lowering of the taxes
since they would be worse off in the absence of free public education provision.
Further, if the economy could not switch swiftly from its current tax rate to a high
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tax regime above τ = 11.5%+, all households would incur non-trivial welfare losses
throughout the transition process. If such costs exceed benefits from reaching a high
tax environment, households would almost uniformly object to a higher tax rate,
as well. Therefore, majority of the electorates of the calibrated U.S. economy could
be content in the neighborhood of their tax regime, thus the economy could stay
inertial at this tax rate.
Regarding the calibrated Nordic economy, agents would almost uniformly vote
against a lower tax rate in the close neighborhood of the targeted tax rate τ =
11.78%, since they would have to incur output and consumption losses as a result
of drops in the tax rate. Further, if the labor supply gets distorted significantly
in response to upward movements in the tax rate, a much higher tax rate would
not be welcome by the electorates, either.39 Finally, if the economy cannot switch
rapidly from a high tax regime to a significantly lower one τ = 3.5%, possibly due
to the presence of preexisting institutions, voters would not want to suffer the non-
negligible transition costs. Thus, they could be content staying inertial in a tax
regime around the calibrated Nordic economy.
In light of these findings, the proposed model can rationalize why large mea-
sures of households could prefer their calibrated tax regimes, and how such economies
39As mentioned in the earlier sections, in the absence of labor supply choice and especially
physical capital, it is probable for the model to overestimate the benefits from high taxes. Future
research on the introduction of physical capital would be enlightening on the limits of high tax
regimes.
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can stay inertial at the two distinct equilibria.40,41
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter concentrates on the differences between the U.S. and the Nordic Eu-
ropean countries in their higher education systems and their finances. To study the
Transatlantic differences, I develop a parsimonious heterogeneous agent OLG model
with both public and private education options available in the choice set of agents,
presence of economy-wide complementarities, spillover benefits from public educa-
tion provision to private school students, and distortionary taxes for public education
financing. I first show that the proposed model can deliver the U-shaped pattern of
per-capita output over public education expenditure shares, a phenomenon I show
is also present in the data. Next, I show that tax differences alone can deliver many
of the observed Transatlantic discrepancies without having to rely on differences in
agents’ preferences, variations in deep structural parameters or introduction of other
unorthodox elements. In particular, by calibrating the model to target countries’
GDP (PPP) per capita and public-to-total higher education expenditure ratios, I
show that a reasonable tax rate difference of 7 percent can endogenously generate
40While analyzing the welfare gains of households over tax rates, off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs
are not implemented and dynamic distributional effects of electorate choices are not taken into
account. Instead, welfare gains at different equilibria are studied to provide insight into potential
ways of endogenizing taxes. Therefore, while it would be erroneous to make inferences on the
“politico-economic” equilibrium, the model can still provide reasonable insight into the electoral
preferences of voters on stationary equilibria choices.
41Introduction of adjustment costs in taxes, e.g. physical allocative costs due to restructuring
education, psychological costs due to cognitive dissonance, internalizing social norms, presence of
history-dependent preferences, etc. can be incorporated into the model to formalize for a more
accurate and rigorous targeting for economies to stay inertial at the exact targeted tax rates.
This chapter aims to deliver the intuition behind the model with the most parsimonious structure
possible, and introduction of these elements is left to future research.
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higher U.S. total education-expenditure-to-GDP ratio, lower U.S. public school at-
tendance ratio and higher U.S. labor supply, as well as more unequal distributions
of income and output for the U.S. when compared to the Nordic countries. Finally,
by investigating welfare implications of alternative tax regimes, I show that either
of the calibrated economies can gain political support from their respective popula-
tions, thereby providing insight into how the two economies can stay inertial at their
distinct equilibria. This result is also essentially arising from the U-shaped behavior
of macro variables over taxes, and the intuition behind this finding is that while
at low rates, an increase in taxes and the provision of public education dampens
human capital accumulation due to drops in private education attainment, at high
tax rates, public education provision gets sufficiently large that a majority of the
population prefer public education over the private one, and an increase in tax rate
boosts public education provision and attainment more than it dampens private
education.
The proposed model clearly has its limitations, too. First, most parameter
values employed in the model are set in accordance with the previous literature,
which offers limited wisdom on the real-world estimates of the model parameters.
Further research, preferably on the micro-level estimation of the parameter values
would certainly improve the reliability of model’s predictions.
Second, in the absence of single-peakedness of preferences over taxes, this
chapter does not endogenize model economy’s taxes, and instead it concentrates
on comparing the welfare consequences of alternative long-run tax regimes. Endo-
genizing taxes would clearly contribute to our understanding of the cross-country
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differences in higher education, yet being beyond the scope of this paper, studying
the formal politico-economic equilibrium is left for future research.
Third, while the model can provide insight into how two distinct equilibria
can gain political consent from their respective electorates and stay inertial at their
long-run equilibria, it does not extend the discussion on the transitional dynamics
or the Transatlantic divergence.42 Especially, the study of transitional dynamics
can contribute to the understanding of off-equilibrium preferences and beliefs of
electorates, thereby enabling the politico-economic equilibrium solution of the pre-
sented heterogeneous-agent economy with uninsurable risk and double-peaked pref-
erences.43 Future work on the transitional dynamics and study of divergence would
be enlightening.
Finally, while the model can contribute to the discussion on how the U.S.
and Scandinavian systems can stay inertial at their stationary equilibria, it cannot
be employed to explain how developed countries featuring predominant public and
private education attainment could be politically sustainable for the same parameter
value space. Further research on the estimation of the model parameters would
contribute to our understanding of these incidences, as well.
42Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss the lack of considerable differences in taxation and redistri-
bution between the U.S. and the continental European countries before the late nineteenth century,
and only a limited number of studies focus on the endogenous evolution of institutions after this
period. Further, those exceptional studies do not particularly concentrate on the divergence of
Transatlantic redistributive or public versus private education policies. For the discussion on the
evolution of institutions, see Aghion et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Acemoglu
et al. (2012), among others.
43Concerning the formal politico-economic equilibrium of the presented model economy, it is
may be essential use to make some necessary refinements on the choice set of agents. Specifically,
in the case of a unique tax rate that maximizes the welfare of a winning coalition of electorates
regardless of the initial conditions, restrictions on the choice of upper and lower bounds for taxes
could be utilized for the survival of two distinct equilibria.
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In spite of these limitations, this chapter can shed at least some light on the
determination and implications of the co-existence of public and private education
types, the presence and sustainability of the Transatlantic differences in education,
as well as extending the discussion on how different complementarity and spillover




Figure 1.23: Return on Education and Literacy Score Inequality by Country
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Figure 1.24: Intergenerational Skill Transmission by Country
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Appendix - Computational Strategy
The computational strategy I employ to solve for the recursive competitive equilib-
rium is a modified heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete markets algorithm
à la Huggett (1993). The way the algorithm is utilized is as follows: for a given tax
rate, first I make initial guesses for aggregate human capital H and public education
E jointly. Second, taking these values given, I solve for the optimal decision rules of
agents in all possible individual-specific human capital h and inborn cognitive com-
petence ξ state pairs by the use of value function iteration. Third, I perform Monte
Carlo simulations for sufficiently large number of periods and households (11000 pe-
riods and 1000 households), discard some initial number of periods (1000 periods).
Then, making use of the generated data, I calculate the mean of the aggregate hu-










= Ê. If the mean of simulated value for aggregate human capital or pub-
lic education is different than initial guess for the variables at a reasonable tolerance
level, i.e. if |Ĥ−H | > ǫtol or |Ê−E| > ǫtol, I update the initial guesses and go over
the same steps until convergence is achieved. For robustness check, I also derive
the theoretical stationary distribution of population using the decision rules and the
exogenous law of motion for the inborn competence shocks, and using the stationary
distribution, I calculate the implied theoretical aggregate human capital and public
education, and compare them against the simulated values. I verify that the implied
human capital and public education values are the same convergent values derived
through Monte Carlo simulations. Through these steps, I also ensure that grids are
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fine enough so that computational errors are kept at a minimal level. For each tax
rate I go over the same steps and derive the respective stationary equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
Transatlantic Differences in Taxation, Redistribution and Provision
of Public Goods: How Fair is Inequality?
2.1 Introduction
Transatlantic differences in taxation, redistribution, and provision of public and pri-
vate goods have been investigated extensively. In particular, the fact that the U.S.
has lower average tax revenue as a share of production, lower share of public expen-
diture in overall education and health care provision, lower social protection expen-
diture as a share of government budget, higher average number of hours worked and
higher income, education and health care inequality than its continental European
counterparts has been a source of inspiration for a number of studies.1 Further, a
growing body of literature documents that while a majority of Americans believe
in a more pivotal role of effort and skill in the determination of final outcomes,
Europeans put more emphasis on the decisiveness of luck. This chapter proposes a
model to explain for the coexistence of these Transatlantic differences, and intends
to provide insight into their political sustainability.
To illustrate the differences in the size of government, Figure 2.1 shows the
level and composition of government spending by country. Noticeably, the U.S.
1For a detailed discussion on the economic and political differences between the U.S. and Europe,
see Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
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Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
government spends less as a share of GDP compared to the developed European
economies, and the difference is particularly more pronounced when the comparison
is between the U.S. and Northern European countries. Figure 2.1 also displays the
composition of government expenditures, which differs considerably across coun-
tries on most, but not all accounts. Of particular importance, while at first glance
education and health care expenditures do not seem to differ radically across the
Atlantic, further investigation on the private provision of these goods reveal oth-
erwise. In order to highlight these Transatlantic differences, Figure 2.2 shows the
level and composition of overall health care and education expenditure as a share
of GDP. It can be seen that while the share of public resources allocated to health
75
care and education in the U.S. is only mildly lower than that of the European aver-
age, private funds allocated in the U.S. on the two accounts far exceed that of the
European average, which in turn implies both the fraction of private expenditure
and the level of aggregate expenditure on education and health care to be markedly
higher in the U.S.2































































































































Public Expenditure on Health Care and Education
Private Expenditure on Health Care and Education
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
Next, I turn to analyzing Transatlantic differences in health care and education
expenditures separately, and show in Figure 2.3 that as the U.S. spends significantly
more on health care compared to the European countries, it relies more heavily on
private financing.
In Figure 2.4, I display total education expenditure by source and show that
the U.S. spends the most on education of any country save Iceland, and private
2For the European average, I use the same subset of developed countries as in Alesina and
Angeletos (2005): Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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Public Expenditure on Health Care
Private Expenditure on Health Care
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)




























































































































Public Expenditure on Education
Private Expenditure on Education
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
spending on education in the U.S. exceeds that of all remaining countries.
As higher education plays a seminal role in the determination of earnings, in
Figure 2.5, I concentrate solely on tertiary education and show that U.S.’s reliance
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on private resources for tertiary education financing far exceeds that of the Euro-
pean countries, even more so than the figures in overall education, implying similar
expenditure compositions in primary and secondary education provisions among
countries under investigation.3





























































































































Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education
Private Expenditure on Tertiary Education
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
On the income side, I display total tax revenue by country in Figure 2.6 and
show that in accordance with the patterns in government spending, the U.S. has the
lowest average tax revenue as a share of its GDP among countries of interest.
When income inequalities of the U.S. and Europe are investigated, gini coeffi-
cients suggest that both pre-tax and post-tax income inequality in the U.S. exceeds
those of all developed European countries, as shown in Figure 2.7.4 While the gini
3Figures on primary and secondary education expenditure by country are available in the Ap-
pendix section.
4The same pattern is observed when other inequality measures, such as the mean log deviation of
income from country means are employed. For a detailed discussion on the Transatlantic differences
in income inequality and their evolution, see Guvenen et al. (2009).
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Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
coefficient on pre-tax income in the U.S. is only slightly higher the European av-
erage, post-tax income inequality is noticeably greater in the U.S., consistent with
the moderating role of higher taxes, redistribution and public goods in Europe.






























































































































GINI Coefficient of Pre-Tax Income
GINI Coefficient of Post-Tax Income
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
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Although there are no directly comparable measures of educational attainment
by country, the literature on education employs international standardized surveys
conducted on population samples to infer the nature of educational dispersion. For
instance, Blau and Kahn (2005) use OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey
and show that there is a higher degree of variation in the U.S. educational attain-
ment compared to the European countries, as shown in Table 2.1. They document
that while the mean scores are not significantly different between the U.S. and the
European countries, U.S. displays more disperse scores in both the right and the left
end of the distribution. Further anecdotal evidence supporting greater inequality
in the U.S. educational attainment is by Barry McGaw, (Director of Education for
the OECD) who states in a speech that “...the very best schools in the U.S. are
extraordinary ... but the big concern in the U.S. is the diversity of the quality of
institutions...” (Fuller, 2005).5
In accordance with economic theory, higher taxes in Europe coincide with
lower average hours worked, as documented by a large number of studies.6 Figure 2.8
displays this pattern by showing average annual hours actually worked per worker by
country. While the Transatlantic differences in hours worked are not as pronounced
as the spending and revenue indicators, it can be seen that American employees
work 9.9% more on average than their European counterparts. Further, except for
Iceland and Italy, American workers on average work longer hours than average
5Regarding health care attainment inequality, although there are not any studies quantifying
inequality across countries, many medical researchers, e.g. Starfield (2000), emphasize that greater
income inequality in the U.S. translates into a relatively higher degree of health care attainment
inequality as well, particularly through the extensive variation in the extent of private medical
insurance coverage.
6Among others, see Prescott (2004), and Alesina et al. (2005).
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50-10 Percentile 90-50 Percentile
Denmark 296.44 38.00 51.44 38.92
Finland 296.75 40.19 54.14 45.82
Italy 251.86 56.58 88.74 52.48
Netherlands 294.07 40.43 55.88 41.12
Norway 300.09 38.62 57.96 40.00
Sweden 311.60 46.37 57.63 52.03
Switzerland 283.36 51.19 64.12 44.18
Europe
Average
290.60 44.48 61.42 44.94
United
States





50-10 Percentile 90-50 Percentile
Denmark 292.86 35.01 56.05 36.49
Finland 296.45 39.18 54.49 42.82
Italy 259.75 50.31 75.07 49.32
Netherlands 300.53 34.17 52.80 36.54
Norway 306.02 37.51 51.33 40.36
Sweden 308.54 43.08 51.01 50.93
Switzerland 278.51 47.53 53.17 43.16
Europe
Average
291.81 40.97 56.28 42.81
United
States
289.56 58.79 73.01 58.34
Based on Blau and Kahn (2005).
workers in all developed European economies.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) emphasize an-
other striking Transatlantic difference in regards to the perception of fairness and
relative importance of effort vs. luck in the determination of final outcomes. They
show that according to the World Values Survey (WVS) 54% of Americans believe
skill and effort is decisive in final outcomes whereas only 29% of Europeans are in
agreement with this belief, with the majority of Europeans believing that luck is
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Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
more pivotal. They also argue for significant uni-directional causality from the per-
ception of high decisiveness of luck to higher per-capita social protection spending,
and they conclude that cross-country differences in perception of fairness endoge-
nously lead to different levels of governmental intervention in the form of taxation
and redistribution, which in turn induces a more unequal income distribution in the
U.S. compared to Europe. Using the same source WVS and extending the sample
size to 2009, I display the fraction of populations with the belief that luck deter-
mines outcomes in Figure 2.9, which suggests comparable statistics as in Alesina
and Angeletos (2005).7
7WVS Association and International Social Survey Programme conduct some further surveys
on the role of effort and roots of poverty. Due to the relatively limited sample size of these survey
results, as well as for comparability and brevity purposes, I display only the results from the
question with the WVS code E040, as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole
(2006). In the appendix I also show the results from the survey question with the code E131, which
asks the respondents why they believe people are in need. Results reveal that while a predominant
majority of Europeans believe people are in need due an unfair society, even a greater fraction of
Americans believe people are poor due to laziness. Such findings, implying even more pronounced
differences across the Atlantic, support evidence on the divergence in beliefs on the role of effort
vs. luck.
82





































































































































Source: World Values Survey (1981-2008)
A final remark on the countries of interest is that both the U.S. and the
Western European countries are known to be well-established democracies with good
performances in measures of electoral process quality and pluralism.8 Therefore, it
can be safe to conclude that tax and redistribution systems, as well as public good
provision policies of the U.S. and European governments should receive considerable
consent from the electorates of their respective countries.
It is a puzzle how such differences in taxation, public good provision, inequal-
ities and beliefs can persist. Earlier attempts addressing Transatlantic differences
succeed to explain only a limited subset of the aforementioned discrepancies, and
only a very limited number of studies incorporate beliefs in their analyses.9 Alesina
8See The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, 2007 and Freedom in the World,
2009 Edition, among others.
9Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a stylized model with beliefs about the “need” to believe
in a just world through cognitive dissonance mechanism. In their model multiple equilibria emerge
due to different levels of effort and concealing bad news from offsprings. The elements of their
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and Angeletos (2005), being an exception, argue by extending Piketty (1995) that if
common perception in an economy is that luck is strongly decisive in economic out-
comes, agents will unlikely be motivated to exert high effort, which in equilibrium
causes luck to be strongly influential and initial beliefs to be verified. In this envi-
ronment, in order to insure themselves against unlucky future scenarios, electorates
favor redistributive policies over laissez-faire ones and economy stays inertial at the
high tax high-luck-decisiveness equilibrium. In contrast, if agents perceive market
to be fair and the role of luck to be minimal, they will be motivated to exert high
effort, which in turn reduces the decisiveness of luck and motivates electorates to
favor laissez-faire policies over pronounced redistributive ones due to foreseeable
future, and thus less need for insurance. However, tailored to explain variations in
beliefs, conclusions of the model by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) rely on unorthodox
restrictions on preferences such as a distaste in inequality, and provide unreason-
able predictions on the political sustainability of the multiple equilibria since their
suggested U.S. and European economies are Pareto-ranked.10 Further, authors do
not study on the role of public vs. private goods in their analysis.11
model, such as the degree of holding back bad news from offsprings are hard, if not impossible, to
measure, which makes the testing of their model challenging and casts doubts on the reliability of
predictions of their model.
10In particular, the low-tax equilibrium for the U.S. by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) features
roughly 5 times greater per-capita labor supply and output than the high-tax equilibrium for
the E.U., and the authors leave it unanswered why Europeans would be content to stay at the
Pareto-dominated equilibrium.
11This chapter also relates to the education and human capital literature. One of the few studies
addressing Transatlantic differences, Benabou (2000) investigates the role of progressivity of taxes
and redistribution on education and shows that two distinct equilibria can emerge depending on
whether the efficiency-enhancing effect of education or the redistributive one dominates. However,
he does not study the implications of the coexistence of public and private education, and does
not take the predictions of his stylized model to data. For other studies, see Zhang (2005), Soares
(2006), Benabou (2002), and Benabou (2005).
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This chapter intends to fill this gap in the literature by proposing an overlap-
ping generations (OLG) general equilibrium model to address the aforementioned
economic differences and differences in perceptions. In order to do so, I propose
a heterogeneous-agent model in which agents can either choose public or private
good (e.g. education), where public education confers positive externalities but re-
quires distortionary taxation. To study Transatlantic differences in perceptions, I
introduce the idea of decomposing income inequality with respect to its “fairness”
by defining whether inequality arises from foreseeable actions and abilities of indi-
viduals, or pure luck. For this purpose, the model features two different types of
shocks: an inborn competence shock which affects optimal consumption, labor and
public vs. private education decision rules together with parental and economy-wide
human capital, and an additively-separable income shock which is orthogonal to de-
cision rules and individual competence levels. I show that low taxes coupled with
low public education provision in the U.S. induce a large impact of inborn compe-
tence on schooling and labor supply, which in turn implies that a large share of U.S.
income differences are due to skill, education and effort, in line with the perceptions
of Americans on income inequality. In Europe, by contrast, a combination of high
taxes and high public education provision minimizes differences due to inborn com-
petence, and magnifies the impact of luck on income differences, in accordance with
European beliefs.
The intuition behind these findings is briefly as follows: first, macro variables
in the model display a U-shaped pattern over taxes, a phenomenon that I show is
also seen the data. This U-shape of variables is because of the fact that starting from
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the laissez-faire economy as economy’s tax rate increases, so do public education
provision and redistribution. This, however, reduces private education attainment of
agents due to the distortionary role of taxes, as well as the disincentivizing extensive
margin effect of free public education. In low tax regimes, decreases in private edu-
cation attainment due to higher taxes outweigh the benefits acquired from greater
public education provision, which in turn lowers aggregate education attainment.
Lower education attainment induces lower aggregate human capital accumulation,
which accordingly reduces total production in the economy, hence generating the
left arm of the U-shape. As the tax rate keeps increasing, public good provision gets
large enough that the majority of the population optimally chooses public education
over the private one, and an incremental increase in taxes boosts public education
attainment more so than it dampens private education, thereby fostering total ed-
ucation attainment, and thus elevating aggregate human capital and output over
taxes.
In regards to the structure of income inequality, attendance at the same public
school equalizes human capital formation across agents, which reduces both total
income inequality and the share of income inequality due to differences in skills and
decision rules. In a low tax regime in which public school attendance is limited,
income inequality is mostly attributed to varying levels of human capital across
households as a result of diverse private education choices. In a regime which dis-
plays a high degree of total income inequality, the share of income variation due to
investment in human capital, competence, and labor supply, i.e. the “fair” variation,
is high relative to the “luck” variation, thereby justifying American perceptions in
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the decisive role of effort and skills. In contrast, in a high tax environment where
predominant public education attendance limits variation in human capital due to
differences in idiosyncratic competence levels, luck shocks account for a higher share
in total income variation, which is in line with European perceptions in a pivotal
role of luck.
This chapter contributes to the literature also by being the earliest calibration
attempt to deliver several economic and behavioral Transatlantic differences jointly.
Further, the calibrated U.S. and European economies, which differ only in regards to
their tax policies, are located on the left and right arms of the U-shape respectively,
which gives rise to the phenomenon that large measures of the electorates of the
targeted economies have comparable welfare levels, thereby providing insight into
how the two regimes can be politically sustainable at the same time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, I describe the




The model I propose is a heterogeneous-agent OLG model with two cohorts, young
and middle-aged, both with the same measure normalized to unity, and there is
no population growth. The young are born with an exogenous stochastic level
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of cognitive competence, which can be thought of as an IQ draw.12 The young
accumulate human capital as a function of competence, as well as private education
bequests from parents (if any), the level of public education consumed, economy-
wide human capital and the parental human capital. Human capital is used to earn
income when middle-aged. The young do not optimize, and only abide by the law of
motion for human capital. The middle-aged decide how much to work, consume and
bequeath for the offspring’s private education given his altruistic preference towards
the young.
There is a single distortionary income tax, which is the only instrument to
finance public education and government transfers. For simplicity, the model as-
sumes the constant long-run tax rate to be exogenous to the economy, although
welfare implications of different tax rates are analyzed as part of the analysis of
political stability. Therefore, the tax rate and fiscal policy rule (i.e. what fraction
of the government spending to be allocated on the provision of public education
vs. government transfers), together with the level and distribution of human capital
and labor supply, determine the level of public education provision and government
transfers.
The primary focus of this chapter is to study the long-run properties of the
variables of interest. Therefore the model assumes there are no aggregate shocks,
which in turn induces the economy to remain at its stationary equilibrium at all
12For the ease of discussion, I use education as model’s “good”. Alternatively, one could model
genetic health draws in lieu of cognitive competence shocks and health care expenditure as a form
of productive investment that can improve health, accordingly human capital. Therefore, it is
possible to extend the framework to address other forms of goods provisions that contribute to
human capital.
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periods where all aggregate variables, as well as their distributional properties, are
constant at their steady-state values.13
In terms of the model’s timing, the middle-aged agent i enters period with a
human capital endowment h ∈ H and observes his child’s inborn competence ξ ∈ Ξ.
Next, for the given tax rate τ , public education provision E and government transfer
Tr, the middle-aged agent i decides whether to choose the public or a different level
of private education e for his offspring, along with what fraction of the period to
devote to work. Public education is provided in a rival and non-excludable way,
yet is offered in a somewhat take-it-or-leave-it fashion: the private school students,
regardless of education bequest levels from their parents, cannot fully enjoy public
education benefits as they have to incur an opportunity cost of forgoing at least some
fraction of the public education benefits. Middle-aged agents who choose private
education for their children incur out-of-pocket costs, but these parents have the
flexibility to pick their desired level of education bequests for their children as long
as they incur their respective pecuniary costs.
When solving for optimal decisions, middle-aged agents can optimize only
over contemporaneous expected consumption due to an additively-separable idiosyn-
cratic “luck” shock that affects income and actual consumption. In other words,
the middle-aged agent i chooses optimal labor and education after observing his
offspring’s inborn competence draw, but before the realization of his idiosyncratic
13Note that in the absence of aggregate shocks, a stationary-equilibrium model in which agents
vote every period features constant endogenous taxes. Therefore, the constant tax assumption of
this model can be considered as a reduced-form extension of a voting model, as welfare implications
of the suggested U.S. and European equilibria are shown to be in accordance with household
preferences in the following welfare subsections.
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luck shock, which in turn requires him to maximize life-time utility over expected,
and not actual consumption. The intuition behind this way modeling is to clarify
the distinction between fair versus luck variation in income: while the middle-aged
agent can alter his labor and education choices in order to respond optimally to
the state of the nature, thereby giving rise to the formation of cross-sectional “fair”
variation in income due to abilities and actions, he cannot respond to or insure
himself against orthogonal income shock draws which induce the “luck” variation in
income.14,15
Output is produced using a labor and human capital augmented technology,
along with an additively-separable the luck component.
Formally, middle-aged i at time t solves:










′, ξ)V (h′, ξ′;H,E, Tr, τ)
} (2.1)
14Note that alternatively if middle-aged agents were to decide on optimal education and labor
decisions after observing the realization of the income shock, the resultant human capital and
labor choices of the young would have been affected both by their inborn competence draws and
income shocks of their parents, which would clearly obscure the distinction between the fair and
luck components of income.
15The sequentiality of the model suggests by the time a middle-aged agent decides on the optimal
education choice of his offspring, he forms rational expectations on future earnings of the offspring,
which only “on average” have to hold, i.e. the “actual” earning of the offspring might differ from
the ex-ante predictions due to the role of pure lock. To exemplify this timing structure, one can
think of the case that by the time a college student commits to a university and a major, while
she can form rational expectations on her future earnings, her actual job market outcome could
diverge from her predictions due to unforeseeable factors such as nepotism, which is captured
by the introduction of the luck shock in the model. However, it must also be the case that the
forward-looking college students are not structurally fooled, or in other words when unobservable
factors are neither good nor bad, the expected earnings are equal to the actual earnings.
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subject to
y = Θl(1−λ)hλ + η (2.2)
c = (1− τ)y + Tr − e (2.3)












log(ξ) ∼ N(µξ, σ
2
ξ ) (2.6)
η ∼ TN(0, σ2η) (2.7)
for given income tax rate τ , aggregate human capital H , public education pro-
vision E, government transfer Tr, and other model parameters, where c denotes
consumption, l denotes labor, h denotes individual-specific human capital at period
t (h′ denotes individual-specific human capital at period t+1, as do other variables
with prime notation), e denotes private education bequest, ρ denotes the altruistic
discount rate, Θ denotes the level of constant productivity, ξ denotes the inborn
cognitive competence of the offspring, πξ(·) denotes the Markov chain transition
probability matrix of the inborn competence process, and πη(·) denotes probabil-
ity distribution of the luck shock, which is independent and identically distributed
across agents and time, hence does not depend on the realization of last period’s
luck draw for a given dynasty.
Equation 2.2 and 2.3 constitute the standard budget constraint of the house-
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hold. Output requires the use of labor and human capital as factors of production,
and tax is paid to the government proportional to income. Education and consump-
tion decisions are made out of disposable income, i.e. net of taxes and transfers. As
shown in Equation 2.4, private education bequests cannot take negative values, and
the private education choice of zero units implies the attendance to public schools.16
Human capital evolves according to Equation 2.5, so that there are economy-wide
complementarities and limited transmission of skills across generations.17 Given the
role of parental human capital in the determination of individual-specific human
capital, middle-aged agents solve a dynamic optimization problem with human cap-
ital being the endogenous and inborn competence the exogenous state. Aggregate-
human capital in the economy facilitates the accumulation of individual-specific hu-
man capital, thereby serving as economy-wide externalities in middle-aged agents’
constrained maximization.
The inborn competence shock is log-normally distributed as shown in Equation
2.6. While households know the distribution of the competence shock, they cannot
foresee or insure against unfavorable competence draws of future generations. Fi-
nally, the luck shock η is distributed with a left-truncated normal distribution with
16As it can be inferred from Equation 2.4, the price of education is normalized to unity, which
is also the price of the consumption good. This simplification is not central to the results, and
does not change qualitative conclusions of the model for a reasonable range of relative prices. In
the case of very adverse realizations of luck shocks which would otherwise force the middle-aged to
consume in negative quantities, I restrict actual consumption to be infinitesimal above zero. This
assumption has negligible general equilibrium consequences, and is intended for computational
purposes.
17Persistent dynastic human capital is a common modeling approach in the literature. Schuetz
et al.(2008) empirically verify the presence of intergenerational skill-passing across countries at
different rates. For a detailed discussion on family background effects of educational performance
and list of studies concentrating on the dynastic human capital transmission, see Hanushek and
Woessmann (2010).
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zero mean and a constant variance as shown in Equation 2.7, and it is orthogonal
to decision rules and inborn competence shocks, i.e. cov(ξ, η) = 0.18
ν in Equation 2.5 denotes the fraction of public education benefits to private
school students, or the “public education spillover”. In other words, if ν takes a
non-zero value, students who attend private education can still enjoy a fraction of
the public education provision, and ν is less than 1 private school students cannot
enjoy public education benefits as much as those who attend public schools.19
Let ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) be the optimal education decision rule to middle-aged
agents’ problem, and h̃(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) be the individual-specific human capital for
next period implied by the optimal education rule. Then, the stationary distribution
of the economy µ(·) satisfies:






′, ξ)dµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ)
(2.8)
where χ(·) denotes the indicator function. The middle-aged agents have rational
expectations, so the aggregate human capital level they take as given in their op-
timization problems must indeed be economy’s resultant aggregate human capital
18The left-truncated distribution assumption is not central for the results and is utilized so that
agents who are are forced to consume at negative levels due to being hit by unfavorable luck
shocks consume at a positive infinitesimal quantity instead. This assumption is essentially because
household preferences are not defined over consumption at non-positive quantities. Note that when
agents have a utility function the slope of which goes to infinity when consumption approaches zero,
as in the presented model, the “punitive” infinitesimal unit of consumption motivates households
to choose “precautionary” labor and education levels that keep them from consuming at the lower
bound for almost all realizations of the luck shock.
19The intuition behind the introduction of public education spillovers is to provide the model
flexibility to investigate alternative school systems. Implications of different spillover rates are
discussed in detail in the following sections.
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hdµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.9)
Further, government runs a balanced budget so that sum of funds allocated
on public education and government transfers does not exceed total tax revenue:
E(τ) + Tr(τ) = T (τ) =
∫
H×Ξ
τydµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.10)
For simplicity, the model assumes government spends a fixed fraction of its
funds in the form of public education and the rest as transfers while satisfying its
budget constraint.20
Tr(τ) = ψT (τ) (2.11)
E(τ) = (1− ψ)T (τ) (2.12)
For the purpose of decomposing variations in income, let total income inequal-




(y − Y (τ))2dµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.13)
Then, given the additively-separable nature of the luck shock and its orthog-
onality to decision rules, variance of income due to luck is determined only by the







Therefore, fair variation is the residual variance in income defined as follows:















For the definition of fair and luck variations in income, following from the
macro literature, income variance decomposition relies on whether inequality arises
from foreseeable actions and abilities of households or from pure luck, as displayed
in equations 2.16 and 2.17. According to this definition, if for instance, two middle-
aged agents with identical inborn skills, education and labor supply choices and
parental human capital happen to have different earnings, the associated discrep-
ancy is attributed to the role luck. If, however income differences arise from objec-
21For the purpose of studying post-tax income inequality, let ỹ = (1−τ)y+Tr denote disposable




Ỹ (τ))2dµ(h, ξ;H,E, T r, τ), where Ỹ = (1− τ)Y +Tr denotes the average disposable income after
taxes and transfers. The post-tax income inequality due to luck then follows σ̃2l (τ) = (1 − τ)
2σ2η,
which implies the fair variation in income to be the residual variance as before: σ̃2f (τ) = σ̃
2
y(τ) −
σ̃2l (τ). Accordingly, the share of fair variation in post-tax income can be defined as ι̃f (τ) =
σ̃2f (τ)
σ̃2y(τ)





tive sources such as different inborn competence capacities of households, unequal
investment decisions on human capital accumulation in the form of education, or
different choices on the number of hours worked, the consequent income differences
are considered a part of the fair variation, as the associated differences are justifiable
by economic foundations.22
2.2.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium under constant taxes and fiscal policy rule is
a set of value functions, decision rules, allocations and stationary distribution, such
that
1. Given H, E, Tr and τ , l̃(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) and ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) are optimal
decision rules to household agent i’s problem, h̃(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) is the implied
human capital rule by optimal education decision, V (h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) is the
resultant value function, and inborn competence and luck shocks follow their
22Clearly, there is no single definition for the fairness of income inequality and different choice of
benchmarks give rise to different outcomes. The definition followed in this chapter is accordingly
not a universal definition, but the closest one to relate to the mainstream macro literature and
reconcile with the connotations by the World Values Survey. The definition I follow suggests
inequality that cannot be attributed to any economic foundations is to be associated with the role
of luck, while income differences due to economic fundamentals, regardless of the concerns on the
distribution of aggregate income, is considered a part of the fair variation. Hence, it is important
to note that the use of the word “fair” in this chapter may not overlap with other subbranches of
economics or disciplines, and is primarily aimed to reconcile with the World Values Survey figures
to address the Transatlantic differences in perceptions.
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exogenous law of motions:










′, ξ)V (h′, ξ′;H,E, Tr, τ)
} (2.18)
subject to
y = Θl(1−λ)hλ + η (2.19)
c = (1− τ)y + Tr − e (2.20)












log(ξ) ∼ N(µξ, σ
2
ξ ) (2.23)
η ∼ TN(0, σ2η) (2.24)
2. Aggregate variables stay constant at all periods, and the time-invariant sta-
tionary distribution satisfies:






′, ξ)dµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ)
(2.25)
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ydµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.27)
4. Government runs a balanced budget and follows its predetermined fiscal rule:
E(τ) + Tr(τ) = T (τ) =
∫
H×Ξ
τydµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.28)
Tr(τ) = ψT (τ) (2.29)
E(τ) = (1− ψ)T (τ) (2.30)
5. Aggregate resource constraint holds:
Y (τ) = C(τ) + E(τ) +
∫
H×Ξ
edµ(h, ξ;H,E, Tr, τ) (2.31)
























Deriving analytical solutions to middle-aged agent’s optimization problem is not
feasible due to non-trivial corner solutions in the extensive-margin decision in ed-
ucation. The nature of the model necessitates the use of global approximation
methods. Accordingly, I employ value function iteration technique as a part of my
computational solution strategy. Further, due to the absence of aggregate shocks
Huggett (1993) algorithm is suitable in solving for the stationary competitive equi-
librium computationally, details of which I discuss in the Appendix.
The parameter values I employ in my benchmark computation are displayed in
Table 2.2. Following Benabou (2002), I set the value of the share of human capital
(λ) to 0.625 and labor to 0.375. Following Zhang (2005), I set the elasticity of human
capital with respect to parental human capital (γ) to 0.2, and the altruism rate (ρ)
to 0.8. In the literature, as the elasticity of human capital with respect to education
(ǫ) varies between 0.15-0.4, I assign a value in between 0.3. Heathcote et al. (2010)
decompose the U.S. wage inequality, and distinguish whether inequality arises from
observables or residuals. They show that post-2000 variance is fairly stable in the
U.S., especially regarding the residual income inequality. I take their estimate for
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Table 2.2: Benchmark Parameter Values
λ 0.625 Benabou (2002)
γ 0.200 Zhang (2005)
ρ 0.800 Zhang (2005)
ε 0.300 Benabou (2002) & Zhang (2005)
σ2η 0.259 Heathcote et al. (2010)
ν 0.500 Neutral Stance from Two Polar Cases
ψ 0.370 US Redistribution Share (OECD Database, 2008)
ω 0.500 Frisch Elasticity=2
φ 0.513 Calibrated to Match US Labor=0.287
σ2ξ 0.769 Calibrated to Match US ιl = 29.88%
Θ 3.345 Calibrated to Match Europe ιl = 42.75%
τUS 7.13% Calibrated to Match US E/E = 44.83%
τEU 11.96% Calibrated to Match Europe E/E = 78.54%
the variance of residuals for the luck shock σ2η after distributional adjustments.
23
Regarding the value of the benchmark fiscal rule parameter, I use OECD’s
estimate for the U.S. ψ = 0.370 on the share of sum of education and health care
spending in total government spending comprised of education, health care and
social protection expenditure only.24
For utility, I use the following balanced-growth consistent contemporaneous
utility function of the form:




I set ω = 0.5 so that Frisch elasticity of labor supply equals 2 as in the mainstream
23In particular, as their estimates are of log-normal wage earnings and the luck shock in my




where σ2w refers to the residual wage variance with zero mean.
24As mentioned in the introduction section, primary and secondary education expenditure levels
and compositions of the U.S. and European economies are very similar, which rules out the possi-
bility that the Transatlantic differences are due to the differences in the early stages of education.
Therefore in the benchmark parametrization, I include only the tertiary education expenditure and
health care spending to proxy for the public good. Inclusion of primary and secondary education
does not alter results of this chapter, qualitatively.
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macro literature. I calibrate the multiplier before disutility of labor to φ = 0.513
so that average hours worked by the model for the calibrated the U.S. economy
coincides with the data.
Due to the absence of earlier studies and data on the public good spillover
rate, I take a neutral stance from the two polar scenarios and set the spillover rate
to ν = 0.5, while I also report the results with alternative parameter values ν = 0
and ν = 1 so as to clarify its implications.
The model with no public education spillover ν = 0 can be considered an
environment where agents can benefit only from one of the two types of education,
or in other words the public education is offered in a perfectly take-it-or-leave-it
fashion. The model with full public good spillover model ν = 1 can be thought of as
an environment where all agents, regardless of their public vs. private good choices,
attend public schools and enjoy full benefits of public education, and those who
want to attain further education beyond the publicly provided level can choose to
do so, only at its respective cost. In other words while agents who choose to attain
private education have to incur its nominal costs, they do not have to forgo public
educations benefits at all. The benchmark model where the spillover is set to ν = 0.5
is tagged as the “limited public good spillover model”, and it is intended to proxy
for the environment where agents choosing private education can still benefit from
the public education, yet not as much as the those who choose public education.
In reality, neither of the two extreme scenarios is very likely and the limited public
good spillover specification is employed for the sake of neutrality, as discussed in
detail in the results section.
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The inborn competence variance σ2ξ = 0.769 and production technology Θ =
3.345 parameter values are chosen so as to target for belief statistics on the share of
luck in total income inequality both for the U.S. and European economies.
Finally, in the computational exercises to target for the U.S. and the European
economies, all parameter values are kept the same except for the tax rate, which is
used for calibration purposes. This parametrization intends to show that without
introducing any unorthodox elements, or relying on variations in “deep” parameter
values, the model can deliver the aforementioned Transatlantic differences just by
relating to tax rate differentials and their endogenous implications.
2.3 Results
In this section, I first report my findings on the behaviors of micro and macro
variables under different tax regimes. Next, I discuss comparative statics with alter-
native parameter values in order to illustrate how different channels affect variables
of interest. Then, I compare model’s predictions with the data and discuss how well
the model fits not only for the calibration targets, but also for remaining developed
economies. Finally, I analyze the behavior of agents’ welfare over taxes so as to
provide insight into how calibrated economies can gain politically consent.
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2.3.1 Benchmark Results
2.3.1.1 Value Functions and Decision Rules
First, I derive value functions and optimal decision rules of households at different
individual-specific human capital and inborn competence state pairs {h, ξ} ∈ H×Ξ,
the former being the endogenous and the latter being the exogenous state from the
household’s point of view. Value functions are verified to be smooth, concave and
increasing in both dimensions.25 ,26
Households who are endowed with high levels of human capital and have off-
springs with high inborn competence draws are better off under the laissez-faire
economy compared to a high tax environment, and agents with low human capital
and inborn competence levels are better off under a high enough tax environment
(e.g. τ = 20%) compared to the zero-tax regime. In economies with a tax rate
in-between the two extremes, life-time utilities of agents are typically lower com-
pared to the two polar tax regimes the reasons of which are discussed in detail in
the following subsections.
In the laissez-faire economy, there is clearly neither any public education pro-
vision nor government transfers, which induces all households to choose private
education, yet at different levels due to their of their human capital endowments
25Given that inborn competence shocks are mean-reverting and not persistent, life-time utility
values vary only moderately across inborn competence states. Individual-specific human capital,
however, persists in a dynasty as a result of limited intergenerational skill-transmission, which
increases the elasticity of the value function to human capital state.
26The value function and decision rules reported in this section are calculated at the equilibria of
the model economies at different tax rates, i.e. the aggregate human capital H, public education
provision E and government transfer Tr arguments of optimal education rules ẽ(h, ξ;H,E, T r, τ)
and value functions V (h, ξ;H,E, T r, τ) are the resultant recursive competitive equilibrium objects.
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and inborn competence draws. As economy’s tax rate goes up, agents with low hu-
man capital and inborn competence states start to leave the private education pool
so as to attend public schools that do not require any out-of-pocket costs. Figure
2.10 and 2.11 display this pattern in education decision rules under two tax regimes.

































































First, except for minor irregularities due to computational limitations, educa-
tion choices are observed to be concave and smooth for both tax regimes. Second,
the flat surfaces in these figures refer to the optimal public education choices of
agents, whereas the monotonically-increasing concave parts refer to the private edu-
cation decisions. It is easy to notice that the flat surface in the higher tax regime in
Figure 2.11 is larger than that of the lower tax regime in Figure 2.10, which exem-
plifies that higher taxes and accordingly higher levels of public education provision
incentivize a larger measure of households to optimally choose public education over
the private one. Also, as the tax rate goes up, in addition to a lower measure of
households choosing private education, optimal private education expenditures di-
minish in magnitude, as well, i.e. parents choose lower private education levels in
the intensive margin because of their lower disposable income and less return on ed-
ucation. Hence, it can be summarized that higher taxes monotonically disincentivize
private education both in the extensive and intensive margin.
Regarding optimal labor supply decisions, Figure 2.12 and 2.13 reveal that
while the number of hours worked do not differ considerably among middle-aged
workers whose human capital exceeds a certain threshold, agents with low human
capital states do not supply as much labor as their productive counterparts. This
result holds as long as economy’s tax rate is high enough so that the middle-aged
agents with very low productivity levels can attain sufficient government transfers
that enable them to enjoy benefits from extra units of leisure that can outweigh
benefits from labor. Further, number of hours worked at different state pairs typi-
cally decrease over taxes as it can be seen by comparing Figure 2.12 and 2.13, yet
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differences in labor supplied as a result of tax rate differentials are much milder
compared to cross-sectional dispersion for a given tax regime.











































































2.3.1.2 Behavior of Aggregate Variables
I compute the recursive competitive equilibria under different tax rates, and show
how aggregate variables change over taxes in Table 2.3. Last five columns of Table
2.3 except for the very last one reveal that levels of public education and government
transfers, as well as the share of public education in total education and fraction
of students attending public schools are all monotonically increasing over tax rates,
as expected. Yet, the first five columns of Table 2.3 display a different pattern in
macro variables: as economy’s tax rate increases, average human capital, output,
consumption, and education first all decrease, and after a threshold they start to
increase.27 The U-shaped pattern of the aggregate variables can be observed more
explicitly in Figure 2.14.
Table 2.3: Stationary Distribution Results over Taxes
τ Y C H L E E Tr Pop.
E
E/E ιl
0.00% 2.046 1.756 0.793 0.338 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 16.87%
2.50% 1.933 1.640 0.725 0.328 0.262 0.032 0.019 0.00% 12.09% 18.50%
5.00% 1.737 1.475 0.612 0.310 0.217 0.057 0.034 19.56% 26.35% 21.49%
7.13% 1.401 1.220 0.424 0.283 0.150 0.067 0.040 53.03% 44.83% 29.88%
7.50% 1.387 1.210 0.417 0.281 0.147 0.068 0.040 55.04% 46.38% 31.37%
10.00% 1.263 1.117 0.351 0.271 0.125 0.083 0.049 75.32% 66.42% 40.76%
11.96% 1.268 1.128 0.355 0.270 0.126 0.099 0.058 85.25% 78.54% 42.75%
12.50% 1.275 1.134 0.357 0.270 0.128 0.105 0.062 87.47% 81.67% 43.22%
15.00% 1.355 1.202 0.400 0.264 0.146 0.134 0.079 94.20% 91.63% 40.08%
17.50% 1.442 1.268 0.448 0.257 0.169 0.166 0.097 98.04% 97.70% 36.89%
20.00% 1.624 1.409 0.557 0.251 0.213 0.213 0.126 100.00% 100.00% 29.99%
Note: Y denotes average output, C denotes average consumption, H denotes average human capital, C denotes
average labor, E denotes public education expenditure, E denotes total expenditure on education, Tr denotes
government transfers, Pop.
E
denotes the fraction of population who attend public education, and ιl denotes the
share of income inequality due to luck.
A brief explanation for the U-shaped pattern of aggregate variables over taxes
is as follows: starting from the laissez-faire economy, as economy’s tax rate goes up,
27Average number of hours worked, being the only exception, monotonically decreases over taxes,
in accordance with economic theory due to the distortionary role of proportional income taxes.
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four factors are in effect, three of which work in favor of and one of which works
against macro variables. First, as taxes lower their disposable incomes, middle-aged
agents reduce their optimal private education decision in the intensive margin. This
effect is valid only for those middle-aged agents who still choose to bequest private
education to their kids, and do not leave private education to join for the public
school pool.28
Second, public education provision has a disincentivizing effect in the extensive
margin. To exemplify this effect, suppose that in the absence of a public education
level of 1 unit, a middle-aged agent chooses to bequest 2 units of private education
to his offspring, which allows the offspring to enjoy a total benefit level of 2 units.





1−ρ(1−ε)γ < 0 as long as skill transmission and discount factor coefficients are lower than
1.
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In the presence of public education, instead of paying the full private education
cost of 2 units and benefit from a total of 2 + 1 × ν(= 0.5) = 2.5, the middle-
aged agent optimally chooses to go with the lower public education level of 1 unit
so as not to bear any private financing costs, and still enjoy a reasonable amount
of education benefits. Hence, public education provision causes a decrease in the
level of total education attained for the individuals whose optimal private education
choices would have been in the close neighborhood from above.
Third effect is the distortions in human capital investment as a result of lower
returns on education: in a high tax rate regime, while the level of education as
in a low tax environment generates the same pre-tax output, respective post-tax
disposable income in the high tax regime is clearly lower than that of the low tax
regime, which discourages private education attainment of the middle-aged. These
three effects, by lowering private education bequests, cause aggregate education to
decrease, which in turn reduces the level of aggregate human capital, and output
since production technology uses human capital and labor, and finally consumption
due to lower disposable income.
The fourth effect, which is the only one working in favor of aggregate variables
is due to the extensive margin decision of the less endowed and limited or full public
education benefits to a certain fraction or all of the population: those who would
choose a private education level below the public education provision in the absence
of public education optimally choose to attend free public schools when they are
available, which induces agents with low human capital and inborn competence
states to be better off by allowing them to attain higher levels of education, thereby
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increasing economy’s aggregate education, human capital, output and consumption.
Also, note that while those in the public education pool fully benefit from an increase
in taxes due to higher public education provision, those who choose to attend private
schools can enjoy partial spillover benefits conditional on the presence of public
education spillovers, as well. All these four effects are amplified by the presence of
economy-wide aggregate human capital complementarities.
2.3.1.3 Fairness of Income Inequality
After investigating the behavior of aggregate variables over taxes, I decompose in-
come inequality and analyze whether it arises from foreseeable actions and abilities
of agents, or from pure luck. The last column of Table 2.3 displays the share of
luck variation it total pre-tax income inequality.29 While the share of inequality due
to luck accounts only for 16.87% under the laissez-faire economy, it monotonically
increases over taxes up to 43.22% at τ = 12.5%, and starts to decrease beyond this
tax rate. The intuition behind the inverted U-shape of the share of luck in total
income variation can be summarized as follows: starting from the zero-tax environ-
ment where all students attend only public schools, as taxes increase two factors
affect the level and composition of income inequality. First, since macro variables
such as human capital and output decrease over taxes, the additively-separable luck
shock accounts automatically for a larger share in total variation in income, which
can be thought of as a level effect. Second and more importantly, as taxes increase,
29Note that since the variance of luck is constant and independent of the variance of output, a
high number for the share of luck variation implies lower cross-sectional income inequality.
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both the provision of public education and government transfers increase, and so
does the measure of agents choosing to attend public schools. The fact that agents
receive the same public education equalizes human capital across agents after a
threshold tax rate, thus reducing total income inequality. Less income inequality
in the presence of a constant luck variance translates into a higher share of luck
in total inequality, or a less “fair” inequality. Between the tax rates 0% and 10%,
both the left arm of the U-shape of macro variables and the moderating effect of
taxes together amplify the share of luck, and beyond this tax rate, increasing macro
variables and moderating role of taxes act in opposite directions. Between the rates
10% to 12.5%, the latter effect dominates the former, thereby lowering fair inequal-
ity and total inequality, and beyond the rate 12.5%, the former effect dominates in
the presence of an already large body of students attending public schools.
2.3.1.4 Distributional Properties of Variables
Next, I study the distributional properties of the variables by focusing on gini coef-
ficients under different tax regimes. Table 2.4 shows that starting from the zero-tax
environment, as tax rate increases, inequalities in human capital, pre-tax and post-
tax output, education and labor all increase up to a threshold tax rate of slightly
more than 7%, and then decrease beyond this rate, thereby displaying an inverted
U-shape pattern over taxes.
Highest variation over taxes in inequality measures is observed in educational
attainment, the gini coefficient of which starts from 0.30, peaks up to 0.366 and then
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Table 2.4: Distributional Properties of the Benchmark Model
τ GINIy GINIŷ GINIc GINIh GINIl GINIe
0.00% 0.333 0.333 0.343 0.505 0.070 0.296
2.50% 0.335 0.332 0.342 0.507 0.078 0.300
5.00% 0.346 0.340 0.341 0.518 0.100 0.346
7.13% 0.353 0.345 0.330 0.527 0.121 0.369
7.50% 0.353 0.344 0.330 0.526 0.121 0.366
10.00% 0.345 0.334 0.316 0.514 0.118 0.279
11.96% 0.338 0.324 0.309 0.503 0.111 0.190
12.50% 0.336 0.322 0.308 0.500 0.108 0.166
15.00% 0.327 0.309 0.301 0.488 0.095 0.074
17.50% 0.320 0.299 0.296 0.479 0.086 0.024
20.00% 0.314 0.290 0.290 0.474 0.075 0.000
decreases down to 0 when all students choose to attend public schools. This result
is not documented in the earlier literature, and is mainly due to the distortionary
role of public education provision in the extensive margin, which could not have
been observed unless the coexistence of both of the education types is studied. As
discussed earlier, as long as the tax rate is not sufficiently large, the fraction of
students who choose to attend public schools is limited; and these students, because
they do not want to bear private education costs, attain less schooling than they
would otherwise in the absence of public school provision. Accordingly, that these
students are content with lower levels of education magnifies cross-sectional disparity
in education, thereby translating into higher gini coefficients in education in low tax
regimes. When tax rate and public education provision get high enough so that a
large measure of agents leave private education pool, taxes moderate inequality in
education, human capital and output, similar to the findings in the literature.
Human capital is distributed more unequally than hours worked, which cre-
ates a less unequal distribution of income than that of human capital. Due to
co-movement of output and education, gini coefficient of consumption does not dis-
play a marked U-shaped pattern but decreases monotonically over taxes, although
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the variation is relatively milder. The patterns in the distributional properties of
variables can be observed more explicitly in Figure 2.15.
2.3.1.5 Model Fit with the Data
As mentioned earlier, I use tax rates to calibrate the model to match the targets,
U.S. and the European average. The predictions of the model, along with the re-
spective figures in the data are displayed in Table 2.5. At the tax rate of 7.13%, the
model endogenously generates a public-to-total-good expenditure ratio of 44.83% as
in the U.S., and at the tax rate of 11.96%, the expenditure ratio is 78.54% as in the
Europe average. Also, at the tax rate of 7.13% the share of luck in income variation
is endogenously 29.88%, whereas at the tax rate of 11.96% the correspondent num-
ber is 42.75%, which are the respective perception figures according to the WVS
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Table 2.5: Comparison of Model’s Predictions with the Data
Country τ E/E ιL Y /Y
US
L GINI(y) GINI(ŷ) GINI(e)
Data
U.S. 12.02% 44.83% 29.88% 1.000 0.287 0.486 0.378 N/A (+)
Europe 21.19% 78.54% 42.75% 0.815 0.257 0.449 0.290 N/A (−)
Model
U.S. 7.13% 44.83% 29.88% 1.000 0.283 0.353 0.345 0.369
Europe 11.96% 78.54% 42.75% 0.910 0.270 0.338 0.324 0.190
data. The model predicts the high tax regime to have an average output of 0.910
times that of the low-tax regime, while the data suggests a slightly lower ratio of
0.815.30 The normalized actual hours worked in the U.S. is 0.287 of a unit period,
whereas this number is only 0.257 in Europe. Model predicts similar numbers, 0.283
and 0.270 for the respective economies. The gini coefficients of both the pre-tax and
the post-tax income in the U.S. is higher than those of Europe in the data, and
due to the moderating role of taxes and transfer, the gini coefficient of the pre-tax
income is higher than that of the post-tax income. Although not up to scale, the
model also suggests similar qualitative prediction on pre-tax and post-tax income
inequality measures. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that education and health
care inequality in the U.S. is higher than that of the European countries, and the dis-
tributional predictions of the model are in accordance with such evidence. Overall,
it is reasonable to conclude that the model can deliver the Transatlantic differences
on several accounts fairly well.
Another merit of the model is in its ability to mimic the U-shape of per-
capita output over public-to-total-good expenditure ratio, as seen in the data, not
only for the calibration targets, but also for the other developed economies. In
30Note that the model locates the calibrated U.S. economy on the left arm of the U-shape,
whereas the calibrated European economy is on the right arm. The importance of the locations of
the targets with regards to U-shape of the aggregate variables is discussed in detail in the following
welfare subsections.
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order to illustrate this feature, first I sort OECD economies with respect to their
public-to-total-good ratios in an ascending order, and then graph public good ratios
jointly with real GDP (PPP) per-capita data. I also include total tax revenues of
these countries as a percentage of their GDPs, and display the resultant graphs in
Figure 2.16.31 It is easy to detect the slightly-distorted U-shape of per-capita output
of countries over their public-to-total-good expenditure ratios, especially when the
filtered per-capita output values are considered.32 Further, the tax trend reveals
that aside from some minor fluctuations, total tax revenue to GDP ratio goes hand-
in-hand with public-to-total-good expenditure ratio.33 Hence, it would be fair to
conclude that the U-shaped pattern generated by the model over taxes and public
good shares is observable in the data as well.
Next, I analyze how well results generated by the model fit to country-specific
data. In order to do so, first I interpolate model’s predictions over the tax rate to
get finer estimates, then I match the interpolated results to the developed Western
European economies with respect to their public-to-total good expenditure shares. I
also do the same exercise for the country-specific WVS belief statistics, as well as for
31Given that developed countries differ substantially in regards to their tax systems which consist
of several complicated non-linear instruments including tax brackets, tax deductable definitions,
progressivity of different magnitudes, etc., instead of ranking countries with respect to their tax
rates, I sort them with respect to their public-to-total good expenditure shares, which is a simpler
yet more objective and standardized measure across countries, and is an endogenous outcome of
alternative fiscal policies.
32One can see in Figure 2.19 that when only the more homogenized subset of Western European
economies are studied (so that the transition economies and non-European countries are excluded)
the U-shape pattern of per-capita income is clearer.
33A simple ordinary least squares regression of public good share on total tax revenue to GDP
ratio unveils that public good ratio is positively and significantly predicted by taxes for the linear
equation of the form: Ei
Ei
= 0.398 + 0.957τi with a probability value of p = 0.0001 for the coeffi-
cient before total taxes, and this result is robust to the exclusion of transition and non-European
economies.
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PPP-Adjusted Real Per-Capita Income (RHS)
Filtered Tax Revenue to GDP Ratio (LHS)
Tax Revenue to GDP Ratio (LHS)
Public-to-Total Education and Health Care Expenditure Ratio (LHS)
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
the average tax shares allocated to the financing of social protection, education and
health care expenditures, as calculated in the fiscal policy parameter calculation. In
Figure 2.17, I show that the tax rate predictions by the model moves in the same
direction as the data, and their co-movement is more evident when the non-linear
trend of the tax rate in the data is considered. Despite the co-movement, however,
the two series are not up to scale due to the parsimonious design of the model.
In Figure 2.18, I show that the non-linear trend of the WVS belief statistics
match the predictions by the model almost one-to-one.
In Figure 2.19, I normalize the per-capita output by the model to the U.S. per-
capita output at its correspondent public-good-expenditure rate, and graph it jointly
with the filtered per-capita output in the data. Figure 2.19 reveals that both per-
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capita output predictions by the model and the filtered per-capita output in the data
initially decrease over public-to-total-good expenditure ratio, and start to increase
after a threshold. Both of the series are minimized at a public-to-total good share of
roughly 77%, although the minimum generated by the model is considerably higher
in magnitude, and model’s predicted output displays significantly less variation over
taxes relative to the data. The noticeable parts of the right arm of the U-shape by
the model are more evident at higher public share rates, and it can be concluded
that while the model succeeds to mimic the patterns in the data well qualitatively,
quantitative performance of the model for country-specific cases could be improved
with a different calibration and parametrization strategy.34
2.3.2 Comparative Statics
In the following subsections, I report and discuss results with alternative parameter
values so as to illustrate the role of different channels in model’s predictions.
2.3.2.1 Public Good Spillover
No Public Good Spillover: I start my comparative statics analysis by studying the
role of the public good spillover parameter, ν, which is taken equally distant from
the two polar cases in the benchmark specification. Keeping the discussion still on
education, first I display the results of the model when there is no public education
34Note that the calibration strategy and parameter values of the model are independent of the
individual European observations, and despite the choice of only dual targets for calibration, the
model succeeds to mimic the U-shape of per-capita output, qualitatively. As discussed in the
comparative statics section, alternative choices for parameter values, especially on the public good
spillover rate, can improve the goodness of fit of the model in terms of country-specific observations.
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spillover, i.e. the environment where private school students cannot benefit from
the provision of public education at all.
Value functions and optimal decision rules are confirmed to be smooth and
concave as in the benchmark case, yet the jumps in the extensive margin decisions
for education are observed to be higher in magnitude relative to the benchmark
model. This finding is due to even higher opportunity costs of private education
in the absence of public education spillovers: in this environment, when students
attend private schools, their parents not only have to bear full private education
costs, but also incur the cost of giving up all benefits from the public education
provision. Accordingly, for middle-aged agents who choose private education for
their offsprings, benefits from the choice of private education must exceed the greater
sum of two costs, thereby causing even more marked jumps in the extensive margin
of education choices.
Table 2.6 summarizes the behaviors of aggregate variables over taxes. Aggre-
gate variables display a U-shaped pattern as before, however, without the public
education spillover especially the left arm is steeper and the depth of the U-shape is
greater in magnitude compared to the benchmark model. This result is again due
to the fact that as the cost of education is higher due to greater forgone benefits of
public education when private education is chosen, education is now less attractive
and hence students attain relatively lower de facto education at all tax rates unless
either all students attend only public or only private schools.35
35Note that the deeper U-shape of the variables in the model with no public education spillover
implies that for a better country-specific match, a lower public good spillover rate for at least for
some subset of countries could improve the goodness of fit of the model.
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Table 2.6: Stationary Distribution Results over Taxes with Zero Spillover (ν = 0)
τ Y C H L E E Tr Pop.
E
E/E ιl
0.00% 2.046 1.756 0.793 0.338 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 16.87%
2.50% 1.916 1.630 0.714 0.327 0.258 0.030 0.018 2.20% 11.89% 18.83%
5.00% 1.649 1.412 0.550 0.312 0.190 0.053 0.031 25.54% 29.52% 24.69%
7.50% 1.305 1.158 0.360 0.294 0.125 0.065 0.038 59.00% 52.63% 39.30%
10.00% 1.172 1.063 0.299 0.285 0.107 0.077 0.045 82.18% 72.24% 46.18%
12.50% 1.191 1.084 0.308 0.278 0.110 0.097 0.057 93.94% 87.81% 45.65%
15.00% 1.238 1.127 0.330 0.272 0.125 0.122 0.072 98.56% 97.91% 43.97%
17.50% 1.363 1.226 0.397 0.263 0.158 0.158 0.093 100.00% 100.00% 38.83%
20.00% 1.624 1.409 0.557 0.251 0.213 0.213 0.125 100.00% 100.00% 29.99%
Another observation from Table 2.6 is that while at all tax rates aggregate ed-
ucation, human capital, output and consumption are less than or equal to the values
from the limited-spillover model, public-to-total education ratio and the fraction of
students attending public schools are higher at all tax rates except for the ones
at which students uniformly attend public or private schools so that the equilibria
under the two specifications are identical. As a result of greater reliance on public
schools and its moderating role on human capital inequality, together with the level
effect in output, the share of luck in income inequality is higher than the bench-
mark model for the tax regimes, except for the ones at which the two economies are
identical.
Table 2.7: Distributional Properties of the Model with Zero Spillover
τ GINIy GINIŷ GINIc GINIh GINIl GINIe
0.00% 0.333 0.333 0.343 0.505 0.070 0.296
2.50% 0.337 0.334 0.339 0.510 0.082 0.317
5.00% 0.349 0.344 0.324 0.526 0.114 0.407
7.50% 0.355 0.348 0.313 0.533 0.143 0.435
10.00% 0.348 0.339 0.304 0.521 0.145 0.337
12.50% 0.328 0.315 0.295 0.489 0.137 0.112
15.00% 0.324 0.309 0.293 0.484 0.132 0.047
17.50% 0.319 0.299 0.291 0.475 0.110 0.001
20.00% 0.314 0.290 0.290 0.474 0.075 0.000
Next, I focus on the distributional properties of the model with no public
education spillover and summarize my findings in Table 2.7. Similar to results
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from the benchmark model, starting from the zero-tax economy education, human
capital, labor, pre-tax and post-tax output inequalities all increase initially over
taxes, and after a threshold of approximately 7.5% the gini coefficients start to
decrease, as in the benchmark model. Also, consumption inequality decreases over
the tax rate as in the former specification. Contrary to the former results, however,
gini coefficients vary more in magnitude relative to the benchmark model, and the
reason is essentially due to higher variation in education, and accordingly human
capital and output as discussed. Overall, it can be concluded that distributional
properties from the no-spillover model mimic findings from the limited-spillover
model closely, although the latter model generates more pronounced variations in
magnitude.
Full Public Good Spillover: In this subsection, I report and discuss the results
when there is full spillover from public education to private school students, i.e.
the environment where all students, regardless of their education choices, can fully
benefit from the available public education provision. As discussed earlier, an al-
ternative way to interpret this specification is that in this environment all students
uniformly attend public schools, and those who are interested in further schooling
choose to attend private education of their choice.
First, I verify the value functions and optimal decision rules to be smooth and
concave as in the two former models. However, under this specification I document
that there are no distinct jumps but smooth transitions in the extensive margin for
education, contrary to the former models featuring opportunity costs of forgoing
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public education when private education is chosen. This finding is due to the fact
that the choice of an infinitesimal higher level of private education compared to
the public school provision does not require giving up public education benefits at
all, and the only opportunity cost of private education in this set-up is the actual
expenditure spent on schooling.
Table 2.8 summarizes the results for aggregate variables. Similar to the limited
and no spillover models, macro variables display a U-shaped pattern over the tax
rate, however the trough points of aggregate variables are far greater in magnitude
compared to those from the two former specifications.
Table 2.8: Stationary Distribution Results over Taxes with Full Spillover (ν = 1)
τ Y C H L E E Tr Pop.
E
E/E ιl
0.00% 2.046 1.756 0.793 0.338 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 16.87%
2.50% 1.935 1.672 0.729 0.325 0.263 0.030 0.018 1.64% 11.65% 18.49%
5.00% 1.862 1.617 0.696 0.297 0.240 0.061 0.036 16.13% 25.59% 19.53%
7.50% 1.832 1.596 0.672 0.269 0.234 0.091 0.054 31.58% 39.03% 19.96%
10.00% 1.807 1.574 0.655 0.249 0.233 0.119 0.070 43.12% 50.89% 20.74%
12.50% 1.816 1.580 0.658 0.251 0.236 0.148 0.087 53.97% 62.65% 20.52%
15.00% 1.867 1.605 0.696 0.249 0.263 0.184 0.108 62.21% 70.06% 19.18%
17.50% 1.980 1.675 0.768 0.244 0.305 0.229 0.135 67.63% 75.05% 17.43%
20.00% 2.089 1.761 0.849 0.244 0.328 0.274 0.161 72.47% 83.70% 15.41%
Starting from the laissez-faire economy, incremental drops in aggregate vari-
ables as a result of higher taxes are much smaller in magnitude. As a result, at
any tax rate macro variables are higher in levels relative to those from the former
two models featuring less-than-full public education spillovers. These findings are
in accordance with economic theory since under this specification the young at-
tain higher de facto education at any tax regime compared to the limited or the
no-spillover models. Moreover, as a result of the fact that a lower fraction of the
population attends solely public schools compared to the former two models and
122
that higher private education amplifies fair income inequality, model’s predicted
share of inequality due to luck is relatively lower at all rates.
Further, while the level of public education at any tax rate beyond zero is
greater in magnitude compared to the former models, the share of public sources in
overall education expenditure and the fraction of population attending only public
schools are significantly lower than those from the former two models. Also, while
the tax rate at which the whole population attends only public schools is 20% in
the benchmark model, only 83.70% of the population finds it optimal to choose only
public education when there is full public education spillover, which again can be
attributed to the lower opportunity cost of private education.
Table 2.9: Distributional Properties of the Model with Full Spillover
τ GINIy GINIŷ GINIc GINIh GINIl GINIe
0.00% 0.333 0.333 0.343 0.505 0.070 0.296
2.50% 0.336 0.333 0.342 0.508 0.079 0.298
5.00% 0.341 0.335 0.343 0.510 0.093 0.284
7.50% 0.344 0.336 0.343 0.510 0.107 0.268
10.00% 0.342 0.330 0.337 0.509 0.100 0.254
12.50% 0.335 0.318 0.321 0.500 0.068 0.200
15.00% 0.332 0.312 0.313 0.492 0.060 0.188
17.50% 0.327 0.303 0.300 0.479 0.048 0.173
20.00% 0.323 0.296 0.285 0.471 0.041 0.154
Table 2.9 displays the distributional properties of variables. Although the gini
coefficients display the inverted U-shape as before, the variation in these coefficients
are considerably smaller in magnitude. The most marked difference compared to the
former two models is in the inequality of education, the gini coefficient of which is
only halved in magnitude at the tax rate 20% relative to the laissez-faire economy,
whereas there is no cross-sectional dispersion in education at this tax rate in the
former two specifications.
123
In Figure 2.20, I highlight the behavior of per-capita output by the three
models over the tax rate. As discussed briefly, the laissez-faire economies of the
three spillover specifications are identical, since alternative ways of modeling public
education spillover has no effect under the tax regimes at which no one attends
public schools. As tax rate goes up, the no-spillover model generates the minimum
and the full-spillover model generates the maximum per-capita output since de facto
education attainment increases over the spillover rate.
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The benchmark model with partial spillover generates output levels that are
in-between the predictions by the two polar scenarios, yet this result holds only
up to the tax rate τ ≈ 20% at which equilibrium the whole population attends
only public schools. At this tax rate and beyond, since all students choose only
public schools both in the no-spillover and the limited-spillover environments, the
two models converge. The intuition behind this result is comparable to that of
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the laissez-faire case: given that there are no private school students in either of
the two equilibria, modeling how public education provision affects private school
students has no real effect. At this tax rate, less than three-fourths of the young
attend solely public education under the full-spillover set-up, and the three models
converge when the whole population in the full-spillover model chooses to attend
only public schools, which happens at an unrealistically high tax rate.
2.3.2.2 Other Comparative Statics
Absence of Inborn Productivity Shocks: In the absence of idiosyncratic inborn
competence shocks, i.e. σ2ξ = 0, middle-aged agents become ex-ante identical, and
the only variation across households is due to the realizations of luck shock, which
does not influence optimal decision rules, as discussed earlier. Therefore, the absence
of inborn productivity shocks transforms the model into an ex-ante representative-
agent model. Table 2.10 summarizes results in the absence of inborn competence
shocks, and shows that macro variables decrease substantially at all tax rates when
there is no uncertainty in regarding ability draws.
Table 2.10: Absence of Idiosyncratic Productivity Shocks (σ2ξ = 0)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 0.818 0.622 0.200 0.342 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
7.13% 0.586 0.472 0.124 0.311 0.113 0.026 0.015 23.24% 0.00% 100.00%
11.96% 0.253 0.234 0.034 0.287 0.019 0.019 0.011 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
20.00% 0.421 0.368 0.080 0.268 0.053 0.053 0.031 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
In essence, this result is comparable to the “precautionary saving” phenomenon
seen in models with physical capital: when there is uncertainty in inborn compe-
tence draws of future generations, middle-aged agents find it optimal to accumulate
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“precautionary human capital” some fraction of which they pass to the next genera-
tions in the absence of physical capital. Accordingly, when there is no possibility of
unfavorable future competence draws, middle-aged agents find it optimal to devote
less resources to education, which results in lower human capital accumulation, and
hence output and consumption. Since the absence of competence shocks eliminates
ex-ante heterogeneity, the fraction of the population attending public schools is ei-
ther zero or unity, depending on level of the tax rate. The U-shape of the aggregate
variables is preserved since the same competing effects are still in act. Finally, as
the only source of variation across agents is due to luck shocks, the share of luck in
total income inequality is 100%.36
Persistent Inborn Productivity Shocks: While economists generally model inborn
competence shocks having log-normal distributions for general equilibrium purposes,
geneticists show that heritability of intelligence in the U.S. is measured to differ
between 0.40 to 0.80.37 In order to show the effects of intergenerational persistence
of inborn competence shocks, I model the idiosyncratic competence stochastic shock
as a first-order autoregressive process as follows:
log ξit+1 = κ log ξ
i
t + ut+1 (2.38)
36If agents have lasting productivity types, i.e. if all agents in a dynasty have the same in-
born competence draws at all times so that heterogeneity is preserved but future uncertainty is
eliminated, the absence of precautionary human capital saving still causes a negative level shift in
macro variables while agents are non-degenerately distributed. The absence of luck shocks does
not alter the qualitative conclusions on the U-shape.
37For discussions on general equilibrium concerns of productivity shocks, see Benabou (2000),
Benabou (2005), Zhang (2005), and for discussion on heritability of intelligence, see Plomin et al.
(1994)
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so that both this specification and the bench-
mark model have the same mean and variance for the inborn competence shock. I
set the value of the autoregressive coefficient to a positive constant, κ = 0.40, and
I report the consequent results in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11: Persistent Inborn Productivity Shocks (κ = 0.40, σ2ξ = 0.915)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.012 1.736 0.759 0.351 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 16.99%
7.13% 1.318 1.177 0.378 0.290 0.141 0.059 0.035 41.98% 49.12% 33.12%
11.96% 1.135 1.018 0.311 0.256 0.117 0.083 0.049 71.16% 77.84% 46.36%
20.00% 1.537 1.339 0.508 0.224 0.197 0.196 0.135 100.00% 100.00% 32.14%
My findings reveal that while the U-shape of the macro variables is preserved,
there is a mild drop in the levels of aggregate variables at all tax rates despite a
higher variance of the shock, σ2u. When the inborn competence shocks are persistent,
a middle-aged agent with a low competence draw knows that his offspring is likely
to have a low competence draw as well. If his disposable income is also low due
to limited human capital endowment, he would not be motivated to bequest high
levels of private education since next generations’ low competence draws will likely
hinder their human capital accumulation anyway. For the middle-aged agents with
high human capital endowments and better inborn competence draws, since future
generations are also likely to have decent inborn competence levels, too much educa-
tion is not extremely essential, which reduces the incentive for precautionary human
capital accumulation. Therefore, information on future shocks by the autoregressive
specification reduces the incentive for educational attainment, which in turn damp-
ens aggregate human capital; and together with economy-wide complementarities,
return on education gets even lower, further amplifying the negative level shift in
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aggregate variables at all tax rates.38
Higher Complementarity Effect of Aggregate Human Capital: In the presence of
higher economy-wide externalities by aggregate human capital, i.e. γ = 0, return on
education gets higher, which in turn encourages middle-aged agents to bequest more
education, thereby inducing even higher aggregate human capital accumulation in
the economy, and pushing up returns on education even further. Moreover, higher
economy-wide aggregate human capital complementarities imply less pronounced
intergenerational skill-transmission, which amplifies future uncertainty that boosts
precautionary human capital savings. As a result, macro variables at all tax rates
get higher in magnitude in the presence of higher aggregate human capital comple-
mentarities, as shown in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12: Higher Complementarity of Aggregate Human Capital (γ = 0.00)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.361 2.039 0.996 0.345 0.321 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 11.71%
7.13% 1.442 1.281 0.444 0.285 0.133 0.068 0.040 50.74% 58.56% 31.30%
11.96% 1.388 1.251 0.416 0.277 0.127 0.110 0.064 86.31% 90.41% 37.47%
20.00% 1.936 1.682 0.759 0.293 0.254 0.254 0.149 100.00% 100.00% 21.44%
While the U-shape of macro variables is preserved, the aforementioned forces
induce the U-shape to have steeper arms, which causes the aggregate-variable-
minimizing tax rate to be lower than the benchmark case, and the share of public
education expenditure and the fraction of population attending public schools to be
higher than the benchmark results.39
38Note that persistent inborn competence shocks imply a stronger intergenerational transmission
channel, since parental transmission of human capital is still present.
39For this and the next exercise, note that the law of motion for human capital is homogenous of
degree one in education, intergenerational skill transmission and economy-wide complementarity,
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Higher Return on Education: When the elasticity of human capital with respect
to education increases by 10%, i.e. ε = 0.330, there is an upward level shift in the
values of macro variables at all tax rates, as shown in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Higher Return on Education (ε = 0.33)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.111 1.783 0.835 0.343 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 15.64%
7.13% 1.555 1.322 0.511 0.295 0.192 0.073 0.043 38.06% 42.14% 24.94%
11.96% 1.321 1.186 0.367 0.274 0.135 0.100 0.059 74.39% 82.01% 36.68%
20.00% 1.697 1.492 0.591 0.288 0.206 0.206 0.121 99.50% 99.50% 25.15%
Education is a choice variable from a middle-aged agent’s point of view, as
opposed to intergenerational skill transmission or economy-wide complementarities
which he takes as given in his optimization problem. Thus, higher return of educa-
tion encourages middle-aged agents to bequest more education to offsprings, which
boosts aggregate human capital and accordingly the remaining macro variables.
Further, as education contributes more to human capital accumulation in the pres-
ence of higher returns on education, an increase in the tax rate does not discourage
the middle-aged agents to reduce their private education decisions as much as in the
benchmark case, which in turn causes a lower measure of students to choose public
education over the same incremental tax increase. Thus, while the U-shape of the
variables is still preserved, the threshold tax rate at which everyone attends public
schools is observed to be slightly above 20%.
Higher Share of Redistribution in Fiscal Spending: As discussed in detail in the
model environment section, tax revenue raised by the government is used both for
which implies that an increase in one of the parameters would induce a decrease in the values of
the remaining ones. In the absence of the complementarity effect of aggregate human capital, i.e.
γ = 1, opposite results relative to the higher complementarity exercise are documented.
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the provision of public education and for government transfers. While the former
form of government spending, by contributing to the accumulation of human cap-
ital, can boost aggregate variables, the latter expenditure is not internalized by
the atomistic middle-aged agents and is used only for consumption purposes. Ac-
cordingly, as displayed in Table 2.14, raising the share of transfers in government’s
budget reduces the level of aggregate variables for the tax regimes other than the
laissez-faire economy at which equilibrium there is no tax revenue raised and fiscal
rule is thereby irrelevant.40
Table 2.14: Higher Share of Redistribution in Government Budget (ψ = 0.407)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.046 1.756 0.793 0.338 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 16.87%
7.13% 1.159 1.043 0.403 0.270 0.116 0.054 0.080 46.55% 53.45% 31.48%
11.96% 1.018 0.912 0.337 0.256 0.106 0.090 0.073 85.09% 89.62% 44.02%
20.00% 1.537 1.370 0.525 0.273 0.197 0.196 0.135 100.00% 100.00% 31.50%
For the remaining parameters, I verify that increasing the share of human
capital in the production function λ, and the altruism (discount) rate ρ boost the
level of aggregate variables at all tax rates while preserving the U-shaped pattern,
which can be seen in the appendix.
2.3.3 Welfare Analysis
After studying the behavior of aggregate variables and comparative statics, next
I analyze how agents’ ex-ante welfare vary under different tax regimes. For this
purpose, first I display the distribution of households over individual human capital
40Note that, despite its adverse affects on the level of aggregate variables, a higher share of
redistribution can still be desirable among a subset of the agents with low very low human capital
endowments and inborn competence draws, who are in the immediate risk of hitting zero bound
for consumption.
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and inborn productivity states for the calibrated U.S. and European economies.
Then, I report and discuss the preferences of agents over taxes so as to provide
insight into political sustainability of the targeted economies.
Figure 2.21: Stationary Distribution of the Calibrated the U.S. Economy
Figure 2.22: Stationary Distribution of the Calibrated European Economy
In Figure 2.21 and 2.22, I display the distribution of middle-aged agents over
human capital and inborn productivity state pairs for the calibrated U.S. and Euro-
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pean economies. I also add respective average human capital levels of the calibrated
economies as the transparent light purple surfaces. It is evident from the figures
that predominant majorities in both simulated economies are endowed with human
capital endowments less than the economy averages. Also, due to the symmetric
stochastic specification of inborn competence shocks, agents are distributed symmet-
rically with respect to inborn productivity states. Therefore, log-normal distribution
of the inborn productivity shock, together with optimal education decisions yield
such results that majorities of households in both economies are endowed with hu-
man capital levels less than the country averages, and when optimal labor decisions
are also taken into consideration, it is easy to show that the same majorities earn
less pre-tax incomes compared to economy averages.
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In Figure 2.23, I display how the aggregate consumption and an egalitarian
welfare measure, which I calculate as the sum of life-time ex-ante welfare of agents
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weighted by their respective population densities, vary over taxes. It can be seen
that the welfare metric mimics average consumption closely, and also displays the
U-shaped pattern over the tax rate with the exception of a noticeable local peak
on the left arm. However, it would be erroneous to immediately conclude from this
graph that the laissez-fair tax policies or very high tax regimes Pareto-dominate
policies in between the two polar cases. In fact, I show in Figure 2.24 and 2.25 that
this is indeed not the case by studying the behavior of value functions of agents over
taxes at agent-specific state pairs.41
Figure 2.24 shows how ex-ante utility of middle-aged households with the same
median inborn productivity but different individual human capital states vary over
taxes. It is easy to see that ex-ante welfare of agents increases over the human capital
state, since middle-aged agents who are endowed with higher levels of human capital
are inherently more productive, thereby they can earn higher pre-tax incomes than
those with lower human capital endowments levels with the same amount of labor.
Another noticeable pattern in Figure 2.24 is the slightly-distorted U-shape of
life-time utility of most of the households except for the ones endowed with very
limited human capital levels. Especially, ex-ante welfare levels of households who
are endowed with high human capital levels and inborn productivity draws initially
decrease over taxes and start to increase after a threshold tax rate, with a U-shape
comparable to that of aggregate variables.
41Because there are four dimensions associated with welfare analyses, i.e. individual human
capital and inborn productivity states, economy’s tax rate and the correspondent value of ex-
ante life-time utility, first I keep the inborn productivity state constant in Figure 2.24, then the
individual human capital state constant in Figure 2.25 to be able to report results using three-
dimensional graphs.
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Figure 2.24: Lifetime Welfare with the Median Inborn Competence (ξ = 1.00)























Figure 2.25: Lifetime Welfare with a Below-Average Human Capital (h = 0.20)
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Regarding the distortions in the U-shape, first it is evident from Figure 2.24
that agents with the lowest human capital endowments prefer higher tax regimes
to the lower ones monotonically, and that they are ones with most pronounced
welfare gains over taxes. It is not surprising that these households who contribute
lowest to the tax revenue base and benefit no less than others prefer high levels
of public education provision and government transfers, thereby higher tax rates.42
Perhaps, more interesting is another deviation from the U-shape that is also present
in Figure 2.23: middle-aged agents whose human capital states are low but not on
the very lowest end of human capital distribution are better off at a tax rate close
to 5% relative to the laissez-faire economy. Beyond this tax rate, ex-ante welfare
of all middle-aged agents but those with the lowest human capital endowments first
decrease up of a tax rate of approximately 10.5% and then start to increase beyond
this threshold. While minor differences across states are observable, the spike on the
left arm of the U-shape is evident for a non-trivial measure of states. Figure 2.25
magnifies this pattern from an another angle: keeping individual human capital state
constant at h = 0.200, i.e. the level around which the largest measure of households
are populated in both of the calibrated economies, I display how ex-ante welfare of
agents vary over taxes for different inborn productivity draws. First, it is easy to
notice that ex-ante welfare of middle-aged agents increase over inborn productivity
draws as expected, since higher draws facilitate the accumulation of human capital
42The careful reader may notice the striking differences in ex-ante welfare between the agents
with lowest human capital endowments and those who own moderately higher human capital. In
essence, this is due to the fact that the middle-aged agents at the very low end of the human capital
distribution are the ones who are more likely to be pushed to the zero bound for consumption in
the event of adverse luck shock realizations, which therefore reduces their expected ex-ante welfare
levels considerably.
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of the offsprings, which they uses next period when middle-aged. Second, Figure
2.25 makes it clear that agents with moderate levels of human capital, especially
the ones with low inborn productivity draws, are better off in a tax regime around
5% relative to the laissez-faire economy. As mentioned earlier, while middle-aged
agents with low human capital endowments prefer high tax regimes to the lower ones
monotonically, households with high levels of human capital have smooth U-shaped
preferences over taxes, as the spike on the left arm of the U-shape in ex-ante welfare
first diminishes and then disappears over human capital states.
Although contrary to the canonical Meltzer and Richards (1981) preferences
over taxes, the idea of double-peaked preferences in education types is not novel.43
The intuition behind the double-peaked preferences over taxes can be summarized
as follows: Middle-aged agents endowed with limited but not extremely low human
capital levels prefer non-zero taxes up to a rate on the left arm such that gains from
redistribution and public education provision, a variant of the Meltzer-Richards
effect, are not offset by the distortionary effects of taxes on aggregate human capital,
a factor pivotal in determining the effectiveness of education on the accumulation
of human capital.
Beyond the threshold tax rate of τ = 5%, further increases in the tax rate
have adverse effects on the level of aggregate human capital, and benefits from
higher public education provision and government transfers are more than offset by
43For the micro-foundations of single-dipped/double-peaked preferences in the presence of public
and private education, see Stiglitz (1974), Barzel and Deacon (1975), Flowers (1975), and for a
recent discussion on single-dipped/double-peaked preferences over the provision of public goods,
see Barbera et al. (2009). Note that all these studies concentrate on the micro-foundations
of preferences in endowment economies, and do not study the interaction of preferences with
endogenous general equilibrium outcomes.
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the drops in aggregate human capital. Once the economy reaches a sufficiently high
tax regime at which majority of students optimally chooses to attend public schools,
positive complementarity effects of aggregate human capital are pronounced again
and the ex-ante welfare of middle-aged agents starts to increase over taxes.44
When economy’s tax rate is close enough to 5%, as in the case for the calibrated
U.S. economy featuring τ = 7.13%, agents with low human capital endowments who
constitute the majority of the electorates as shown in Figure 2.21, would object to a
significant reduction in the tax rate since they would be worse off in a very low tax
regime. Further, if the economy could not switch immediately from a tax rate of 5%
to a sufficiently high tax regime beyond τ = 10.5%+ for reasons such as institutional
restrictions, physical or social adjustment costs, history-dependent preferences, etc.,
electorates might have to incur non-trivial welfare losses throughout the transition
process, and if such costs exceed benefits from switching to the new equilibrium,
high-tax regime supporters may not be able to form a winning coalition. Therefore,
in the neighborhood of the calibrated economy, majority of the electorates could
be content with the present tax rate, and the economy could stay inertial at this
equilibrium.45
Electorates in the calibrated European economy almost uniformly object to
44Clearly, single-crossing property does not hold globally, yet a weaker local version is observed
to hold around the two peaks: numerically, if a middle-aged agent with the individual human
capital state (h1, ξj) prefers τ = 5% over τ = 0, so does the agent with (h2, ξj) pair where h1 > h2.
Similarly, if the middle-aged agent with (h1, ξj) prefers τ = 10.5%+ to τ = 10.5−%, so does the
middle-aged with (h2, ξj). Also, while tax rates below 5% give more life-time utility than 10.5% for
most of the individuals, such comparison is not immediately applicable for the higher tax regimes.
45The deviation of the calibrated economy from the politically-favored tax regime of 5% could
be attributed to the calibration strategy, as well as to other democratic imperfections, such as
“status-quo bias”. For instance, Gilens (2012) shows that the probability of adopting of a new
policy in the U.S. is only 50% even when up to 90% of Americans favor policy changes, especially
regarding redistributive policies.
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a lower tax rate in the close neighborhood of the targeted rate of τ = 11.96%,
since their welfare would decrease as a result of a drop in the tax rate due to
consequent decreases in the provision of public education, government transfers,
and aggregate human capital. If the economy cannot move swiftly from a high tax
regime to a significantly lower one around 5%, possibly due to the aforementioned
reasons, electorates would not vote in favor of the regime-switch in order not bear
the non-negligible transition costs, and would be content staying at the targeted tax
regime.46
In light of these results, the proposed model can provide insight into why
large measures of households could prefer the targeted tax regimes, thus how the
calibrated economies can stay inertial at the two distinct equilibria.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I concentrate on the differences between the U.S. and Europe in
the levels of taxation, redistribution, provision of public goods, and perception of
fairness in income inequality. I propose a heterogeneous-agent OLG model in which
agents can choose either public or private education, and public education confers
positive externalities but requires distortionary taxation. To study the Transatlantic
differences in perceptions, I decompose income inequality with respect to its “fair-
46If the model was enriched in a way that the punitive role of taxes were incorporated (for
instance by relaxing the closed-economy, or absence of physical capital assumptions), predictions
that a higher tax rate than the calibrated European equilibrium is favored by electorates could
be revised. Further, note that the higher de facto redistributive share of government spending in
Europe, which was not taken into consideration in model’s predictions, also puts a limit on the
benefits from very high tax regimes.
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ness” by defining whether inequality arises from foreseeable actions and abilities of
individuals, or from pure luck. The model I propose features two different types of
shocks: an inborn competence shock which affects optimal consumption, labor and
education decision rules together with parental and economy-wide human capital,
and an additively-separable income shock which is orthogonal to decision rules and
competence draws of agents. I show that low taxes and low public education provi-
sion in the U.S. induce a large impact of inborn competence on schooling and labor
supply, which in turn implies that a large share of U.S. income differences are due
to ability, education and effort. In Europe, by contrast, high taxes and high public
education minimize differences due to inborn competence, and magnify the impact
of luck on income differences, as in accordance with existing beliefs. I also show
that, due to the U-shaped behavior of macro variables over tax rates as seen in the
data, both the U.S. and European economies can be preferred by large measures of
electorates, providing insight into how the two different regimes can be politically
sustainable at the same time. The intuition behind the U-shape of macro variables
is that at low tax rates an increase in taxes and public education provision dampens
human capital accumulation due to drops in private education attainment, while at
high tax rates, public education provision gets large enough that the majority of
the population prefers public education over the private one, and further increases
in the tax rate boost public education attainment more than they dampen private
education.
Aside from its merits, admittedly the model has some limitations. First, most
parameter values employed in the model are set in accordance with the previous
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literature, which is yet very limited. The values of some of these parameters, such as
the public good spillover rate, are challenging to link to the data. Further research,
especially on the micro-level estimation of these parameter values could improve the
reliability of model’s predictions.
Second, while the model can provide insight into how the U.S. and European
systems gain support from their respective electorates, it does not address how
developed countries with predominant mixture of public and private goods systems
are sustainable for the same parameter sets. Therefore, further research on micro-
foundations of the model parameters would contribute to our comprehension of
country-specific cases better, as well.
Finally, although the model can provide insight into how the two different
equilibria can gain political support and persist, it does not put forward the sources
of the divergence in the last one and a half centuries, which is beyond the scope of this
chapter.47 Future work on transitional dynamics of the Transatlantic divergence,
as well as transitional properties of the presented model would contribute to the
literature considerably.
Despite these limitations, this chapter succeeds to shed light on the role of
taxes and fiscal policies in the determination of Transatlantic differences in economic
and behavioral variables, implications of the coexistence of public and private goods,
as well as different complementarity and spillover channels in a general equilibrium
47Alesina and Glaeser (2004) document that there were not substantial differences between the
U.S. and the continental European countries in terms of taxation and redistributive policies back in
1870s. Only a limited number of studies concentrate on endogenizing the evolution of institutions,
and the exceptions do not particularly concentrate on the public vs. private good compositions or
differences in beliefs. For the literature on the endogenous evolution of institutions, see Aghion et
al. (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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design. Further, by proposing a simple yet powerful heterogeneous OLG model, this
chapter opens a gate to the study of Transatlantic differences within the neoclassi-




































































































































Public Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education
Private Expenditure on Primary and Secondary Education
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)






























































































































Public Expenditure on Health Care and Tertiary Education
Private Expenditure on Health Care and Tertiary Education
Source: OECD Database (2004-2008)
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Figure 2.28: Fraction of the Population with the Belief that People are in Need due






































































Source: World Values Survey (1981-2008)
Figure 2.29: Lorenz Curves for Education with Limited Spillover







































Figure 2.30: Lorenz Curves for Human Capital with Limited Spillover













































































Figure 2.31: Lorenz Curves for Output with Limited Spillover
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Figure 2.32: Lorenz Curves for Consumption with Limited Spillover








































Figure 2.33: Lorenz Curves for Labor with Limited Spillover






































Table 2.15: Higher Share of Human Capital in Production (λ = 0.686)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.111 1.783 0.835 0.343 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 15.64%
7.13% 1.555 1.322 0.511 0.295 0.192 0.073 0.043 38.06% 42.14% 24.94%
11.96% 1.321 1.186 0.367 0.274 0.135 0.100 0.059 74.39% 82.01% 36.68%
20.00% 1.697 1.492 0.591 0.288 0.206 0.206 0.121 99.50% 99.50% 25.15%
Table 2.16: Higher Altruism Rate (ρ = 0.880)
τ Y C H L E E Tr E/E Pop.
E
ιl
0.00% 2.355 1.978 1.000 0.353 0.377 0.000 0.000 0.00% 0.00% 12.99%
7.13% 1.743 1.465 0.620 0.307 0.225 0.080 0.047 35.53% 39.28% 20.54%
11.96% 1.415 1.233 0.433 0.280 0.157 0.111 0.065 70.62% 79.25% 32.03%
20.00% 1.663 1.439 0.581 0.286 0.220 0.215 0.126 97.93% 98.42% 27.62%
Appendix - Computational Strategy
The computational strategy I employ to solve for recursive competitive equilibrium
is a modified heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete markets algorithm à
la Huggett (1993). The proposed algorithm works as follows: for a given tax rate,
first I make initial joint guesses for aggregate human capital H , public education
E and government transfers Tr. Second, taking these values given, I solve for
optimal decision rules of agents in all possible idiosyncratic human capital h and
inborn productivity ξ state pairs by the use of value function iteration technique.
Third, I perform Monte Carlo simulations for sufficiently large number of periods
and households (11000 periods and 1000 households), discard some initial number
of periods (1000 periods), and using the generated data, I calculate averages of the
















= T̂ r. If any of the simulated
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values is different than the initial guess for the variables at a reasonable tolerance
level, i.e. if max{|Ĥ−H|, |Ê−E|, |T̂ r−Tr|} > ǫtol, I update my initial guesses and go
over the same steps until convergence is achieved. For robustness check, I also derive
the theoretical stationary distribution employing decision rules and exogenous law
of motion for the inborn productivity shocks, and using the stationary distribution
I calculate the implied theoretical aggregate human capital, public education and
government transfers, and compare them against the simulated values. I verify that
the implied human capital, public education and government transfer values are the
same convergent ones from the Monte Carlo simulations. Throughout these steps, I
also ensure that the grids and interpolations are fine enough so that computational
errors are kept at a minimal level. For each tax rate I go over the same steps and
derive the respective stationary equilibrium.
Appendix - World Values Survey
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a wave of surveys conducted by the non-profit
The World Values Survey Association seated in Stockholm, Sweden. The WVS aims
to investigate beliefs, perceptions, values and motivations of people throughout the
world for the purpose of better serving social scientists and policy-makers. In order
to keep track of the trends, the WVS (jointly with European Values Survey, EVS)
has executed six waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2012, and the findings from the
earlier five waves, covering up to 2007 are available online. In my analyses, I make
use of all the publicly-available data. The wording and structure of the questions I
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and earlier studies employed are as below:
• Hard work brings success (WVS Code E040)
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with
the statement on the left; (10) means you agree completely with the statement on
the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number
in between.
Agreement: Hard work brings success.
Possible Answers
(1) In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life
(10) Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and
connections
I rescale the responses coded on a scale of 1 to 10 to range between 0 and 1, and
calculate the relevant statistics.
• Why are people in need (WVS Code E131):
Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are
two opinions: Which comes closest to your view?
Possible Answers
(1) Poor because of laziness and lack of will power
(2) Poor because of an unfair society
(3) Other answer
148
I exclude the observations with the “other answer”, and rescale the responses coded
on a scale of 1 to 2 to range between 0 and 1.
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